Regulatory Fit and Consumer Brand Preferences by Sams, Johnny A.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
ETD Archive
2010
Regulatory Fit and Consumer Brand Preferences
Johnny A. Sams
Cleveland State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/etdarchive
Part of the Psychology Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in ETD Archive by an
authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sams, Johnny A., "Regulatory Fit and Consumer Brand Preferences" (2010). ETD Archive. 590.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/etdarchive/590
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REGULATORY FIT AND CONSUMER BRAND PREFERENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
JOHNNY A. SAMS 
 
 
 
 
Bachelor of Arts in Psychology 
 
Cleveland State University 
 
May, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN PSYCHOLOGY 
 
at the 
 
CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
December, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© COPYRIGHT BY JOHNNY ANTHONY SAMS 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This Thesis has been approved 
for the Department of Psychology 
and the College of Graduate Studies by 
 
 
_________________________________________________ 
Thesis Chairperson, Ernest S. Park 
 
 
____________________________ 
Department/Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________ 
Stephen D. Slane 
 
 
____________________________ 
Department/Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________ 
Andrew B. Slifkin 
 
 
____________________________ 
Department/Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 REGULATORY FIT AND CONSUMER BRAND PREFERENCES 
 
JOHNNY A. SAMS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Research has demonstrated that consumer perceptions of products are affected by 
the “fit” between their regulatory focus or goal orientation and their conception of what 
products can offer in terms of satisfying the goals activated by that orientation. This 
research has focused on product features and the way product messages are framed for 
consumers. However, research has not focused on fit in terms of brand names and the 
types of regulatory orientations (promotion vs. prevention) that can be associated with 
them. This issue has potential implications for consumers and how products can be more 
effectively marketed to them. Given that research has demonstrated the consumers make 
product choices based on fit, the following was hypothesized in this study: H1: The more 
promotion-focused one is, the more positive product ratings will be if the brand name is 
associated with promotion concerns and strategies; and H2: The more prevention-focused 
one is, the more positive product ratings will be if the brand name is associated with 
prevention concerns and strategies. While not the primary foci of this paper, effects based 
on the following two hypotheses were also examined: H3: As independent self-construal 
scores increase, the more likely it is that product ratings will be higher for brand names 
associated with promotion concerns and strategies; and H4: As interdependent self-
construal scores increase, the more likely it is that product ratings will be higher for brand 
names associated with prevention concerns and strategies. To test the hypotheses, 
participants were given individual difference measures, then asked to rate cars and sports 
teams with brand names created for the study. Sports teams were included given the 
iv 
 expectation that consumer identify strongly with them (in addition to car brands). Brand 
names appeared in two types: promotion and prevention. After the ratings, participants 
were given a recall task for cars they had rated earlier in the study. Then, demographics 
were collected and participants were debriefed. While the results were not consistent 
across the ratings, each of the four hypotheses demonstrated some instances of support.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This paper will begin with a literature review that will cover several topics related to 
the psychology of consumer behavior. These topics will build upon one another and lead 
to a set of proposed hypotheses to be examined in this research. First, a self-regulation 
framework will be presented to describe how people pursue goals and respond to their 
situation during goal pursuit. The paper will move on to a discussion of self-guides, 
which describes the process of psychological identity formation and maintenance. Then, 
the concept of self-discrepancy will be discussed, after which personality in terms of 
regulatory focus will be covered in detail. The discussion of regulatory focus will include 
the two types of regulatory focus to be examined (promotion and prevention), cultural 
considerations, and early environmental influences that shape the development and 
activation of these regulatory foci. Then, discussion will center on ways regulatory foci 
relate to attitudes and persuasion. This discussion will then lead to an explanation of 
regulatory fit, a concept that is key to the hypotheses explored in this research. 
Ultimately, novel applications of regulatory fit principles will be introduced and tested, 
and the potential benefits of this approach will be considered.  
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 1.2 Self-Regulation f 
 
Self-regulation has been defined as the process in which individuals attempt to 
bring their behaviors and self-conceptions into alignment with relevant goals or standards 
(Brockner & Higgins, 2001; Brockner, Paruchuri, Idson, and Higgins, 2002), and it 
occurs when reaching an activated goal requires conscious effort. In goal pursuit, there 
must be a defined standard or goal that is to be met, and if unmet, people engage in self-
regulation to reduce discrepancies between their current state and these desired outcomes 
(target goals or standards). One model that can be used to illustrate the process of self-
regulation goes by the acronym, TOTE (Carver & Scheier, 1992).  
TOTE outlines the process by which feedback systems such as self-regulation 
work. In TOTE, there are four basic steps: Test, Operate, Test, and Exit. In the first test 
phase (Test), the operator of a system monitors itself to determine whether its current 
state matches its desired end state (goal). If this first test does not yield a match (the goal 
is not met), then the operator engages in behaviors that move one closer to his/her 
identified goal (Operate). Next, the operator again examines his/her situation and assesses 
the degree to which progress has been made to determine whether the defined goal has 
been reached (Test). If there is a match between the operator’s current state and desired 
end state, meaning the goal has been met, self-regulation is no longer required and the 
operator exits the process (Exit). If a discrepancy between the current state and desired 
end state still exists, then a loop in the TOTE process occurs. In this case, the operate 
phase is again instigated to facilitate movement towards the goal, and this continues until 
the Exit phase is reached.     
The process of self-regulation can be likened to the workings of a temperature 
control system. In this system, a thermostat would function as the operator. When the 
1 2
 thermostat is set (goal/standard is activated), its goal is to regulate the temperature of a 
room so the difference between the temperature and its setting is zero. In order for this 
regulation to be successful, there are several steps that must occur. First, the thermostat 
must test. In this test, the thermostat compares the room temperature to its setting. If there 
is a difference between the room temperature and the thermostat’s setting, then the 
thermostat initiates operation. In the operation phase, the thermostat instructs the furnace 
to run and the furnace begins running so the temperature of the room more closely 
matches the desired thermostat setting. Next, the thermostat runs its test again and 
compares the room temperature to its setting to see if the desired outcome (goal) has been 
met. If the difference between the room temperature and the thermostat’s setting is zero, 
then the system discovers the desired outcome has been achieved and the thermostat 
initiates the exit phase. In the exit phase of the process, the thermostat instructs the 
furnace to discontinue running because at this point, the temperature goal has been met. 
There is a match between the room temperature and the thermostat’s setting, so it is no 
longer necessary for the furnace to operate.    
1.3 Self-Guides 
While a thermostat has a temperature goal, humans have self-relevant goals. 
These goals are called self-guides. Self-guides are integral to self-regulation because they 
often set and define the standards to be met. Self-guides are representations of what one 
desires to be like, and they contain characteristics that one is motivated to possess. Self-
guides or standards can be defined by societal norms or personal norms, and are likely to 
be influenced by people who are important to the individual. While the content of self-
guides will be idiosyncratic for every individual, theorists suggest there are two broad 
2 3
 types of self-guides that people hold in common: ideal self-guides and ought self-guides 
(Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997).  
An ideal self-guide is a standard defined by how or what one would like to be. As 
the label suggests, this is a representation of the idealized self, consisting of the 
characteristics and properties one hopes, aspires, and wishes to possess (Higgins, 1987). 
For example, an individual may have an image of the self as carefree, spontaneous, 
daring, and heroic, much like an explorer, trailblazer, or pioneer. This representation 
would be an ideal self-guide, a standard that the individual aspires to reach when the goal 
is activated. Conversely, an ought self-guide is a standard defined by how or what one 
should be. As implied, this representation of the ought self consists of the characteristics 
and properties one feels obligated to possess. This self is an image of who one ought to 
be, or should be, and is defined by standards that focus on upholding one’s morals, 
values, duties, and responsibilities. For instance, a person’s ought self-guide might be a 
standard where the individual is represented as being civic-minded, righteous, honorable, 
and acting with integrity and morality. When people think of the ought selves they strive 
to actualize, they might be imagining themselves as the type of person who stands up for 
others, and who defend the weak, helpless, and needy.  
Implicit in the prior examples is the assumption that peoples’ cognitions of how 
or what they hope to be, or should be, are not necessarily how they actually are in the 
present. While it would be great if in reality people were identical to their self-standards 
of who they want to be and should be, obviously this is not the case. Instead, there can be 
a difference between an individual’s self-guides, whether their target is an ideal self (how 
one hopes to be) or ought self (how one thinks one should be), and a person’s actual self 
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 (one’s conception of how one actually is). When someone tries to be the person he/she 
wants to be or should be, but has not reached that goal yet, a self-discrepancy exists. 
1.4 Self-Discrepancy 
A self-discrepancy is the perceived difference between one’s current state and a 
given end-state (Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997; Strauman & Higgins, 
1987). In self-discrepancy theory, an individual’s current state is that person’s actual self, 
whereas an individual’s cognition of a given end-state is either one’s ideal or ought self 
(Higgins, 1987). These self-guides, or standards, are contrasted to one’s actual self in a 
manner consistent with the TOTE model. Since the self-guides serve as the standard to be 
met, the individual monitors for  self-discrepancies, which would indicate improvements 
or progress needs to be made.  
When such self-discrepancies occur, the individual experiences negative emotions 
(Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997; Strauman & Higgins, 1987), which 
presumably act as an alarm to inform the individual that the goal has not yet been met, 
and to further motivate the individual to continue his/her goal pursuit (Strauman & 
Higgins, 1987). The specific nature of these negative feelings depends on the type of self-
discrepancy being experienced. If a discrepancy exists between an actual self-
representation and an ideal self-representation, one is likely to feel dejection-related 
affect.  
As an illustration, if a salesman has an ideal self-representation of being an 
adventurous risk-taker, but happens to find himself unwilling to take a gamble when 
faced with a potentially lucrative but risky opportunity, he will feel disappointment and 
dejection. Alternatively, if a discrepancy between the actual self-representation and an 
5 
 ought self-representation exists, one is likely to feel agitation-related affect (Higgins, 
1987; Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986; Strauman, 1989; Strauman & Higgins, 
1987). For instance, if a successful lawyer has an ought self-representation of being 
consistently available to fulfill her duties as a parent, but in actuality finds herself 
spending long hours at work and neglecting her parental responsibilities, she will feel 
agitation and anxiety.  
The presence of either type of negative affect helps one recognize self-
discrepancies, and makes it salient to the individual that standards have not been reached.  
Subsequently, the motivation to engage in self-regulation becomes activated because 
engaging in self-regulation (operation phase of TOTE) is needed to meet one’s goals, and 
thus needed to escape aversive feelings of negativity (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). 
Importantly, the reduction of self-discrepancies can be executed through various 
regulatory strategies. The regulatory strategy that is used depends on an individual’s 
regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997). 
1.5 Regulatory Focus 
 Regulatory focus refers to the way goals are cognitively framed and the process 
by which they are selected and pursued by an individual (Brendl & Higgins, as cited by 
Fellner, Holler, Kirchler, & Schabmann, 2007; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Forster, Higgins, 
& Bianco, 2003; Liberman, Molden, Idson, & Higgins, 2001). There are two types of 
regulatory foci, called promotion and prevention focus (Higgins, 1997), and which 
orientation is activated at any given time may depend on one’s disposition or the situation 
(Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000). Specifically, the more a person has ideal self-guides 
activated, the more promotion-focused he/she is. Alternatively, the more a person has 
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 ought self-guides activated, the more prevention-focused he/she is. People differ in terms 
of which type of self-guides they more chronically act on, thus, individual differences 
exist with regard to what one’s default regulatory focus is.   
 While there are two types of regulatory foci (promotion and prevention), Higgins 
(1997) proposed that each type is central to its own unique input-output system. That is, 
each type of regulatory focus is central to a system that can predict goal-pursuit 
behaviors. Each regulatory system contains three input variables and four output 
variables. Specifically, three variables in a given system activate a particular type of 
regulatory focus (promotion or prevention) which, in turn, yields certain behavioral 
tendencies as described by four output variables.  
1.5.1 Promotion 
According to Higgins (1997), a promotion focus is activated by the following 
three (input) variables: ideals, nurturance needs, and gain/non-gain situations. Ideals, as 
mentioned previously, are an individual’s wishes, hopes, and aspirations, goals for how 
one would like to be. For instance, a retiring professional with a promotion focus may 
often activate an ideal self-guide that characterizes himself as being carefree, prompting 
the desire to purchase beachfront property and to leisurely travel the country. This same 
promotion individual might also frequently be motivated by nurturance needs such as 
growth and development. For example, during his professional career, this individual 
may have been an ambitious entrepreneur who worked to build a chain of luxury hotels, 
largely driven by the desire to attain recognition, social status, and positive regard from 
others.  
While concepts such as ideals and nurturance needs may be relatively   
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 straightforward concepts, gain/non-gain situations bear more explanation. For illustration, 
assume that the retiree referenced above is a contestant on a game show. On the show, 
contestants compete for money through a series of anagram-solving tasks. That is, 
contestants must unscramble series of letters to form words. In this scenario, each 
contestant starts with no money. For each anagram that a contestant solves, he is eligible 
to win $500 (gain). For each one that he does not solve, the amount he is eligible to win 
does not increase (non-gain). This is a gain/non-gain situation because for those involved, 
there is nothing to lose and there are only positive outcomes to be gained. According to 
Higgins (1997), such a situation would likely activate a promotion focus, and would be 
independent of prevention-focus concerns (which deal with avoiding losses).  
While it has been explained that ideals, nurturance, and gain/non-gain activate a 
promotion focus, it is still necessary to explain what tendencies (output) a promotion 
focus will likely yield once activated. One such tendency is a sensitivity to information 
that informs one about the probability of positive outcomes. That is, persons with a 
promotion focus cognitively frame situations such that they are attuned to monitor for the 
presence or absence of positive information or outcomes. For example, suppose that 
before the retiree began his former career in the luxury hotel business, he had a stint as a 
law student attempting to pass his bar exam. Assuming he was promotion-focused, this 
student may have attempted to monitor his performance by asking himself: “How many 
answers did I get right so far?”  
If he believed that his number of correct responses was sufficient to pass the 
exam, then he would have anticipated the presence of a positive outcome. If he believed 
that his number of correct responses was insufficient to pass the exam, then he would 
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 have anticipated the absence of a positive outcome. Given that this promotion-focused 
individual would have had a hedonic preference for positive outcomes, it is likely that he 
would have responded to information or outcomes in a manner consistent with the TOTE 
model described earlier. In such a case, the goal would be to perform at a level of effort 
believed optimal for passing the exam. That is, if, after asking himself how many answers 
did he think he had right at any given time (Test), the student believed that his number of 
correct responses was insufficient to pass the exam, it is probable that he would have: 
increased his amount of effort (Operate), asked himself again if his number of correct 
responses was sufficient to pass the exam (Test), and maintained effort at a level he 
believed was optimal to pass the exam until it was completed (Exit).     
While promotion-focused persons exhibit a sensitivity to positive information or 
outcomes, this type of sensitivity is complimented by their tendency to pursue goals with 
a state of eagerness and to focus on productivity. This state of eagerness entails a related 
tendency for promotion-focused individuals to engage in goal-pursuit using eagerness 
means. Specifically, persons with a promotion focus are likely to frame goal-pursuit in 
terms of ensuring hits (presence of positive outcomes, or gains) and ensuring against 
misses (absence of positive outcomes, or non-gains).  
So, in the case of the former promotion-focused law student, it is likely that he 
would concentrate on getting as many correct answers (hits) as possible, which would 
result in a willingness to guess on questions where he was unsure of the correct response. 
Since a promotion focus will lead one to pursue the goal of successful performance with 
the mindset of “answer correctly” rather than “don’t answer incorrectly”, this type of 
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 person will find it more strategic to guess on a question rather than pass up an 
opportunity to get a question right.   
While promotion-focused individuals are likely to use eagerness means in goal-
pursuit, they are also likely to experience certain emotions in the face of hits (successes) 
and misses (failures). Specifically, in the event of successfully meeting a goal (gain, hit, 
presence of positive outcome), promotion-oriented individuals are likely to feel 
cheerfulness-related emotions (e.g., happiness, elation). In the event of failure to meet a 
goal (non-gain, miss, absence of positive outcome), these same individuals are likely to 
feel dejection-related emotions (e.g., sadness, disappointment). For instance, in the case 
of the game show contestant, the more he successfully solved anagrams and earned more 
money, the more he would feel cheerfulness-related emotions such as joy. If the 
contestant did not solve any anagrams and earned no money, he would likely feel 
dejection-related emotions such as disappointment. Thus, a promotion focus is associated 
with sensitivity to the presence or absence of positive outcomes (Higgins, 1996, 1997) 
with a relative emphasis on aspirations and accomplishments (Higgins, 1996). 
1.5.2 Prevention 
According to Higgins (1997), a prevention focus is activated by the following 
three (input) variables: oughts, security needs, and non-loss/loss situations. Oughts are an 
individual’s sense of duties, obligations, and responsibilities, goals for how one should be 
or needs to be. These are standards that denote how one “ought” to act or “should” act, 
which are independent from the “ideals” that convey how one “wants/hopes” to act. For 
instance, a retiring professional with a prevention focus may have an ought self-guide 
that characterizes him as being civic-minded and prompts him to search for volunteer 
10
 opportunities. This same individual might also be motivated by security needs such as 
safety concerns. For example, over the course of his professional career in public service, 
if he was motivated to feel a sense of personal security he may have prioritized his 
responsibility to pay back the debts he owed. This goal would result in him quickly 
satisfying all of his financial obligations, including the mortgage he once had on his 
home. With a prevention focus, he might be more content living in his home that he paid 
off, rather than incur financial risk investing in a new “dream” home for his retirement, 
where he would be anxious and preoccupied with trying to escape a loss-situation (owing 
money).  
While concepts such as oughts and safety needs may be relatively straightforward 
concepts, non-loss/loss situations bear more explanation. For illustration, assume again 
that the retiree referenced above is a contestant on a game show. On the show, 
contestants compete for money through a series of anagram-solving tasks. That is, 
contestants must unscramble series of letters to form words. In this scenario, however, 
each contestant is given $5,000 at the start of the game. For each anagram that a 
contestant solves, he does not incur a financial loss (non-loss). For each one that he does 
not solve, he loses $500 (loss). This would be considered a loss/non-loss situation 
because for those involved there is nothing to be gained by performing well. Instead, one 
is working to prevent losing what one already has. According to Higgins (1997), this 
situation would activate a prevention focus because the dynamics of the game mirror 
prevention concerns.  
 While it has been explained that oughts, safety, and non-loss/loss activate a 
prevention focus, it is still necessary to explain what tendencies a prevention focus will 
101
 likely yield once activated. One such tendency is a sensitivity to information that informs 
one about the possibility of negative outcomes. That is, persons with a prevention focus 
cognitively frame situations such that they are attuned to monitor for the presence or 
absence of negative information or outcomes. For example, suppose that before the 
retiree began his career in public service, he had a stint as a law student attempting to 
pass his bar exam. Assuming he was prevention-focused, this student may have attempted 
to monitor his performance by asking himself: “How many answers did I probably get 
wrong so far?”  
If he believes that his number of incorrect responses will cause him to fail the 
exam, then he would have anticipated the presence of a negative outcome. In this case, he 
may go over his answers again so he can detect any errors that were overlooked. With 
this prevention-focused law student, it is likely that he would concentrate on avoiding as 
many wrong answers as possible, which would result in reluctance to guess on questions 
he was unsure about. Since a prevention focus will lead one to pursue the goal of 
successful performance with the mindset of “don’t answer incorrectly” rather than 
“answer correctly”, this type of person might find it more strategic to avoid guessing on a 
question (i.e., skip it) rather than answering it and taking a chance of getting it wrong. In 
the interest of passing the exam, however, it is likely that this person would later return to 
the question and deal with it after all others have been answered. This way, the question 
would become the sole focus of his/her attention and can be carefully considered before 
answering. Through these promotion and prevention examples, one should note that the 
goal (passing the bar exam) was the same across both scenarios, and where the 
differences in regulatory foci exist are in terms of how this goal was framed and pursued.  
12
 A second tendency for those with a prevention focus is to pursue goals in a state 
of vigilance and to focus on accuracy (rather than productivity). This state of vigilance 
entails a related tendency for prevention-focused individuals to engage in goal-pursuit 
using vigilance means. Specifically, persons with a prevention focus are likely to frame 
goal-pursuit in terms of ensuring correct rejections (absence of negative outcomes, or 
non-losses) and ensuring against mistakes (presence of negative outcomes, or losses).  
While prevention-focused individuals are likely to use vigilance means in goal-
pursuit, they are also likely to experience certain emotions in the face of correct 
rejections (successes) and mistakes (failures). Specifically, in the event of successfully 
meeting a goal (non-loss, correct rejection, absence of negative outcome), prevention-
oriented individuals are likely to feel quiescence-related emotions (i.e., calm, relaxed). In 
the event of failure to meet a goal (loss, mistake, presence of negative outcome), these 
same individuals are likely to feel agitation-related emotions (i.e., anxiety).  
For instance, in the case of the game show contestant, if he successfully solved 
the anagrams and was able to keep the money he had, he would feel quiescence-related 
emotions such as calmness or relief (in contrast to the promotion example where success 
resulted in joy). In the case where the contestant misses correct responses or makes 
errors, as the number of mistakes and money lost increases the more he would feel 
agitation-related emotions such as anxiety (in contrast to the promotion example where 
disappointment was felt). Thus, a prevention focus is associated with sensitivity to the 
presence or absence of negative outcomes (Higgins, 1996, 1997) with a relative emphasis 
on duties and obligations (Higgins, 1996). 
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 1.5.3 Early Experiences 
 Interestingly, research suggests that early experiences in the home can influence 
which regulatory focus a person is likely to chronically adopt (Higgins, 1987, 1997). For 
example, in promotion-oriented parent-child interactions, a child might be rewarded for 
behaving in a desirable manner. Specifically, the child might receive a favorite snack for 
cleaning his room, or $10 for doing well in school. If the child misbehaved, however, the 
parents may express disappointment and the child may forfeit any pending rewards (not 
receive dessert). Through interactions with the child in this promotion-oriented manner, 
the child receives the message that what matters is the attainment of ideals through 
accomplishment.  
In such cases, success in meeting goals (ideals) represents the presence of positive 
outcomes (gain, hits, cheerfulness-related emotions), whereas failure to meet goals 
(ideals) represents the absence of positive outcomes (non-gain, misses, dejection-related 
emotions). Thus, children can become sensitive to particular types of information or 
outcomes based on their interactions with parental figures. In the case of a promotion 
focus, children learn to become attuned to the presence or absence of positive information 
or outcomes. This sensitivity, in turn, can be used to optimally adjust behavior for goal-
pursuit in a manner consistent with the TOTE model. Thus, frequent promotion-oriented 
parent-child interactions and their attendant goal-pursuit processes set the stage for the 
development of a chronic, dispositional promotion goal-orientation. 
In prevention-oriented parent-child interactions, a child might be taught to avoid 
irresponsible behaviors, or advised to behave in a very prescribed way. Specifically, the 
child would not experience negative outcomes (nor would he/she receive positive 
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 rewards) from consistently doing homework, or consistently saying “please” and “thank 
you” when situations so prescribe. However, if the child did not behave as expected, the 
parents may criticize the child and assign him a punishment. Through interacting with the 
child in this prevention-oriented manner, the child receives the message that what matters 
is the fulfillment of duties, responsibilities, and obligations through vigilant attention to 
his behavior.  
In such cases, success in meeting goals (oughts) represents the absence of 
negative outcomes (non-losses, correct rejections, quiesence-related emotions), whereas 
failure to meet goals (oughts) represents the presence of negative outcomes (loss, 
mistakes, agitation-related emotions). Thus, children raised under a prevention 
orientation learn to become attuned to the absence or presence of negative information or 
outcomes. This sensitivity, in turn, can be used to optimally adjust behavior for goal-
pursuit in a manner consistent with the TOTE model. Thus, frequent exposure to 
prevention-oriented parent-child interactions and their attendant goal-pursuit processes 
set the stage for the development of a chronic, dispositional prevention goal-orientation. 
1.5.4 Cultural Considerations 
While early parent-child interactions can predispose an individual to chronically 
adopt a particular regulatory focus, research also suggests that culture and socialization 
practices can also influence which regulatory focus a person is likely to chronically adopt 
(Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000; Zhang & Mittal, 2007). In Western cultures such as the 
U.S. and Western Europe, the standard of socialization is individualism (Triandis, 2001). 
So, the norms, values, and practices of individualist cultures focus on the personal self, 
prioritize personal goals, and often consider and emphasize how one differs from others 
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 (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989). Through socialization, people in these 
cultures often develop self-concepts that center on uniqueness and distinctiveness from 
others, and the self is construed as being independent from one’s in-groups (Triandis, 
2001). However, it is critical to clarify that terms like individualist (and collectivist) 
reference the nature of a society and do not refer to the psychology of an individual. This 
is important because while societies are designated as being either individualist or 
collectivist (to be discussed shortly), members of any given society can have self-
construals that are highly independent, interdependent, or even both. For instance, while 
research has shown that individualist cultures are likely to promote the development of 
independent self-construals in society members, where people define themselves (“who 
they are”) based on personal traits and characteristics (Lee et al., 2000), individualist 
cultures can and will also contain members who think and act like members of 
collectivist cultures, because these particular members have self-construals that are 
highly interdependent (Triandis, 2001).  
With the mindset of an independent self-construal there is an emphasis on the 
hopes, dreams, and ideals of individuals and the value of individual accomplishments are 
favored more than any consideration of prescribed roles, or collective concerns. So, 
independents are not as motivated by obligations to others (such as a group), duties, and 
responsibilities, as they are by self-relevant desires and personal principles. Personal 
freedom and being “true to oneself” are values that are prioritized in individualist cultures 
and by people with independent self-construals. The importance of such values has been 
demonstrated throughout the history and folklore of individualist societies. For example, 
during the U.S. Civil War, family members made decisions to side with either the Union 
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 or Confederate Army, based on their personal principles and ideologies. In some cases, 
not all family members were unanimous on which side they elected to align with. Such 
familial rifts often resulted in “brother fighting brother” on the battlefield, which goes to 
show that in these societies individual convictions take precedence over even familial 
bonds.  
Given that individualist societies socialize members to value personal freedoms, 
there are fewer social constraints imposed on people. Thus, there are fewer prescribed 
rules for how one “should” or “ought” to act, and less severe sanctions when norm 
violations occur. Given the cultural emphasis on individual liberty and freedom, people in 
individualist cultures are socialized from an early age to think about their idiosyncratic 
hopes, dreams, and aspirations (e.g., “What do you want to be when you grow up?”), and 
are socialized to pursue these goals (e.g., “reach for the stars”, “land of opportunity, 
where dreams come true”). For all of these types of reasons, individualist Western 
cultures tend to produce people that are relatively promotion-focused, people who focus 
on accomplishments and are thus sensitive to signs of achievement and positive 
outcomes, cues that would indicate success. Again importantly, these statements and 
characterizations also hold true for people that score high on independent self-construal 
scales, regardless of their cultural background (Singelis, 2004).  
In Eastern cultures, the standard of socialization is collectivism (Triandis, 2001). 
In a collectivist culture, such things as one’s role in social groups (family, work, 
community), harmony, and responsibility are valued highly. So, individuals in collectivist 
cultures are less focused on viewing themselves in terms of being an individual than they 
are focused on viewing themselves in terms of what group they belong to (Markus & 
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 Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989), what their responsibilities are to the group, maintaining 
social harmony, and are, therefore, interdependent within their in-groups. Because people 
are socialized to value group membership (e.g., family) and thus similarities (rather than 
differences) with close others, collectivist societies foster the development of 
interdependent self-construals, where the self is defined (“Who am I?”) in relation to 
connections with others (“I am a father.”). In such cultures, this construal of the self can 
be seen when a person is asked “How are you doing?” A common response is “We are 
doing fine (Smalley, 2009).” This default response illustrates the mindset of an 
interdependent person because one is answering from the perspective of one’s group (in 
contrast to “I am fine”), and the pronoun “you” is interpreted as referring to a group 
entity such as one’s family rather than a reference of the specific individual.  
Given this collectivist mindset, the principles of duty, responsibility, and 
obligation are prioritized in such cultures, and social harmony and collective well-being 
are highly valued notions. Meeting these types of standards often require the sacrifice of 
individual desires. The importance of such values has been demonstrated throughout the 
history and folklore of collectivist societies. For example, during World War II, the 
Japanese, concerned about U.S. interference in their military operations, launched a 
kamikaze attack on the U.S. at Pearl Harbor. Such an act of personal sacrifice was 
deemed necessary by the Japanese for the long-term collective well-being of their 
society. Given the emphasis on collective well-being, such acts of suicide were perceived 
by the Japanese as an honorable cause of death. To give one’s life for one’s family, or 
country was considered as socially responsible, and therefore, the right thing to do in the 
face of certain threats (such as the U.S.). Without such sacrifices of individual desires, 
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 cooperation in collective societies would be difficult and the social harmony and well-
being of the group would be jeopardized. So, in collectivist cultures, individual self-
interest is perceived as a threat. As a result, collectivist cultures have more norms and 
rules that dictate how one should or ought to act, and more severe sanctions against any 
deviations from such norms and rules (Triandis, 2001).  
Given that people in these prevention-oriented, collectivist societies are not 
rewarded for following rules and are punished for violating them, people in these 
societies are sensitive to loss/non-loss situations. In keeping with this mindset, 
collectivist cultures often include morality classes as a requirement in their educational 
curriculums. Given the emphasis on strictly prescribed behaviors and the perception of 
self-interest as threatening to the collective well-being of the group, people in collectivist 
cultures are socialized to conform to the principles of duty, responsibility, and obligation 
(e.g., “How does my family think I should behave?”, “What do my parents want me to be 
when I grow up?”). This conformity is perceived as necessary to avoid negative outcomes 
(such as interference with the WWII Japanese military operations). Given these 
perceptions and standards, collectivist Eastern cultures tend to produce people that are 
relatively prevention-focused, people who are sensitive to signs of negative outcomes that 
would indicate potential failure or conflict. These statements also hold true for those who 
score high on interdependence on independence-interdependence scales, or, in other 
words, those with interdependent self-construals, regardless of their cultural background 
(Singelis, 2004).  
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 1.6 Persuasion 
Understanding the regulatory focus framework is valuable because it helps 
explain subjective differences between people, and the constructs can be strategically 
applied in meaningful ways. Given that individuals with differing regulatory foci 
(promotion vs. prevention) frame and pursue goals in unique ways (eagerness vs. 
vigilance strategies), it seems fair to say that they can be motivated by different cues. One 
way that these cues may be administered is through persuasion from other people. This 
persuasion, of course, would occur through some means of communication. One medium 
of communication might be advertising.  
Cesario, Grant, and Higgins (2004) examined the aforementioned possibilities. 
Specifically, they hypothesized that when messages are framed in a manner consistent 
with an individual’s regulatory focus, they are more persuasive. A rationale behind this 
hypothesis was the idea that when there is a match between a given message and an 
individual’s regulatory focus, this could generate a sense of “feeling right”. This sense of 
“feeling right”, in turn, “transfers” to the perceived “rightness” of what someone is 
reading, or doing. To examine this possibility, participants in the first study were given 
messages regarding the importance of consuming more fruits and vegetables.  
In the promotion condition, the message was framed in terms of accomplishment 
(i.e., increased energy, better moods) to situationally induce a promotion orientation. In 
the prevention condition, the message was framed in terms of safety (i.e., protection of 
the body from the environment) to situationally induce a prevention orientation. Within 
each condition, the message was also presented in terms of eager means (gain/non-gain 
information – e.g. “if you eat the right amount of fruits and vegetables, you can actively 
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 help keep yourself safe from illness and obtain overall good health.”), or vigilant means 
(nonloss/loss information – e.g. “if you do not eat the right amount of fruits and 
vegetables, you cannot actively help keep yourself safe from illness and facilitate overall 
good health.”).  
Participants were then asked to rate how persuasive the message was. It was 
found that the participants in the promotion condition rated the message as more 
persuasive when framed in terms of eager means than they did when it was framed in 
terms of vigilant means. Conversely, it was found that participants in the prevention 
condition found the message more persuasive when it was framed in terms of vigilant 
means, than they did when it was framed in terms of eager means.  
The second study was an extension of the first in that it examined consumer 
persuasion in terms of dispositional regulatory focus. After participants were 
administered regulatory focus measures (RFQ and unspecified), they were randomly 
assigned to one of two conditions. In the promotion condition, participants were given an 
article explaining the benefits of a recently developed after-school program using 
language framed in terms of eager means (e.g. “The primary reason for supporting this 
program is because it will advance children’s education and support more children to 
succeed.”). In the prevention condition, the same article was given, but it was written in 
terms of vigilant means (e.g. “The primary reason for supporting this program is because 
it will secure children’s education and prevent more children from failing.”).  
The results showed that those with a promotion focus found the article framed in 
terms of eager means more persuasive, while those with a prevention focus found the 
article framed in terms of vigilant means more persuasive. What these results suggest is 
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 that the persuasiveness of a message can depend on the interaction between target’s 
regulatory focus and the framing of a message. That is, when the framing of the message 
is congruent, or fits, with one’s regulatory focus, messages are more persuasive and the 
content is perceived as more important and valuable (Kim, 2006; Latimer, Katulak, 
Mowad & Salovey, 2005; Zhao & Pechmann , 2007). These results are illustrative of 
what is known as the “regulatory fit effect”.  
1.7 Regulatory Fit 
So, given the aforementioned studies, the regulatory fit effect not only applies to 
the framing of messages about outcomes, but it also, by extension, applies to individuals’ 
appraisals of the outcomes themselves. The end result is that a person’s subjective value 
of a message regarding an outcome can become the subjective value of the outcome 
itself. In other words, this perception of value can, in turn, be projected onto evaluations 
of things that are (or, are not) of interest to individuals (Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 
2003; Higgins, Idson, Freitas, Spiegel, & Molden, 2003). For example, in the 
aforementioned after-school program message-framing study, the perceived value in the 
message of “secure(ing) children’s education and prevent(ing) more children from 
failing” can very easily, through the “transfer” of value, become the perceived value of 
the program itself. Given this “transfer” of value, individuals with a promotion focus are 
likely to prefer things that they associate with promotion-oriented end states, while those 
with a prevention focus are likely to prefer and/or be affected by things that they 
associate with prevention-oriented end states.  
Examples of things that might be referenced in an instance of regulatory fit would 
be the attributes of products marketed to consumers. Chernev (2004) addressed this idea 
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 when he examined regulatory fit in terms of specific product attributes: hedonic, 
performance-related, utilitarian, and reliability-related. It was assumed that those with a 
promotion focus would place more weight on hedonic and performance-related attributes, 
as those with a promotion focus are more likely to be concerned with hedonic 
(pleasurable) and positive (performance) outcomes (Chernev, 2004). Conversely, it was 
assumed that  those with a prevention focus would place more weight on utilitarian and 
reliability-related attributes, as such persons are more likely to be concerned with 
practicality (utilitarian) and maintaining the absence of negative outcomes (reliability) 
(Chernev, 2004).  
In the first study (Chernev, 2004), participants were randomly assigned to a 
promotion or prevention condition. Participants in the promotion condition were asked to 
write down their hopes and aspirations, while those in the prevention condition were 
asked to write down their duties and obligations. The purpose of this task was to prime 
participants for a given regulatory orientation. Participants were then asked to complete a 
paper-and-pencil maze. The maze depicted a mouse inside. The objective was to 
successfully identify a path for the mouse to exit the maze. However, this objective was 
framed differently according to the experimental condition involved.  
In the promotion condition, a piece of cheese was illustrated just outside the 
maze. So, in the promotion condition, the objective was framed in terms of finding a way 
out of the maze to get to the cheese. In the prevention condition a snake was depicted 
inside the maze. So, in the prevention condition, the objective was framed in terms of 
finding a way out of the maze to avoid getting devoured by the snake. After completing 
the maze, participants in both conditions were presented with a series of decision tasks in 
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 which they were asked to choose between two alternatives, one being superior on a 
hedonic attribute and the other being superior on a utilitarian attribute. That is, 
participants were asked to choose between a more pleasurable (hedonic) alternative, or a 
more practical (utilitarian) alternative.  
Participants selected alternatives from a category like toothpaste. For example, in 
the toothpaste category, participants were asked to choose which alternative was more 
appealing to them: the one superior in teeth whitening (hedonic), or the one superior in 
decay prevention (utilitarian). In this pair of options, it is reasonable that teeth whitening 
was labeled as hedonic, because white teeth are generally regarded as more pleasurable 
stimuli than yellow teeth. In addition, white teeth are an ideal, not a necessity. Decay 
prevention is a utilitarian concern, because this concern is both useful and necessary, as 
healthy teeth are necessary to properly process food. As predicted, results indicated that 
those in the promotion condition were more likely to select the hedonic options, while 
those in the prevention condition were more likely to select the utilitarian options. 
The design of the second study (Chernev, 2004) was similar to that of the first 
study, but the attributes and categories changed. The attributes examined were 
performance vs. reliability and the categories used were TV, computer monitor, and car. 
For instance, in the car category, participants were asked to choose which attribute set 
they found more appealing: speed and power (performance), or warranty and 
maintenance (reliability). It was predicted that those in the promotion condition would be 
more likely to select the performance options. This prediction was logical, given that 
performance-related attributes such as speed and power relate to such ideals as 
accomplishment (promotion). It was also predicted that those in the prevention condition 
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 would be more likely to select the reliability options, as reliability relates to such 
concerns as safety and avoiding negative outcomes such as breaking down (prevention). 
Results indicated that those in the promotion condition were more likely to select the 
performance options, while those in the prevention condition were more likely to select 
the reliability options. 
Werth and Foerster (2006) also examined regulatory fit in terms of product 
attributes when they examined the possibility that consumers based their product 
evaluations and preferences on comfort vs. safety such that those with a promotion focus 
would place more weight on the comfort attributes of a product (that which would be 
ideal), whereas those with a prevention focus would be more interested in its safety 
attributes (that which ought to be in place). In the first study, participants were instructed 
to enter into a computer three promotion goals and three prevention goals. The purpose of 
this instruction was to measure the regulatory orientation of participants. Regulatory 
orientation was measured by comparative entry times. That is, the set of goals showing 
the quickest entry times represented the regulatory orientation that was the strongest in a 
given participant. The rationale for this means of measurement was that goal strength 
would be positively correlated with the accessibility of a goal (cf., Clore, 1994; Frijda, 
1996, as cited in Werth & Foerster, 2006), thereby manifesting in quicker entry times 
(Fazio, 1986).  
Next, participants were asked to rate twenty items relating to product features of 
sunglasses and watches. The items asked what types of product features participants 
preferred for each product. Half the items in the questionnaire were comfort-related 
features (promotion) half were safety-related features (prevention). Results showed that 
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 promotion-focused individuals valued comfort features more (ideal), while prevention-
focused participants placed more value on safety features (ought).  
An additional study (Werth and Foerster, 2006) found that not only was a 
regulatory fit effect apparent in terms of consumer preferences for product features, but 
also that there was a regulatory fit effect in terms of consumer preferences for product 
domains. Specifically, participants were asked which product choice they placed more 
value on: condoms (responsibility), or lipstick (ideal). Results indicated that prevention-
focused consumers placed more value on condoms (responsibility), while promotion-
focused consumers placed more value on lipstick (ideal). Further, when the nature of a 
product matched the type of advertising text assigned to it (prevention-framed or 
promotion-framed), consumers with a matching regulatory focus placed more value on 
the product than if there was no match. 
While research has demonstrated a regulatory fit effect in terms of consumer 
preferences for product attributes and domains, Chernev (2004b) examined the possibility 
of a regulatory fit effect in terms of consumer preferences for the “status quo”. That is, he 
hypothesized that while promotion-focused consumers would be more willing than 
prevention-focused to assume the risk involved in choosing a new product alternative, 
prevention-focused consumers would prefer to remain with the status quo product. The 
rationale for the hypothesis was that as prevention-focused individuals are more sensitive 
to information regarding negative outcomes (Higgins, 1997), they are likely to place 
more weight on losses relative to promotion (gain) oriented consumers. Losses, in this 
case, would be the potential consequences of making selections other than the status quo 
(representing the perceived safety of that which is known). 
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 Participants were randomly assigned to a promotion or prevention condition. 
Those in the promotion condition were asked to write about their hopes and aspirations, 
while those in the prevention condition were asked to write about their duties and 
obligations. Then, participants across both conditions were presented with a set of two 
cameras and asked which one they liked better. Each camera was described across four 
dimensions: lens clarity, ease of use, battery life, and weight. One camera was better in 
terms of lens clarity and weight, while the other was better in terms of battery life and 
ease of use. After making their decisions, participants across conditions were then 
randomly assigned to one of two additional conditions: neutral or status quo.  
Participants were then presented with a set of six cameras, two of which were 
from the first set, and were given the opportunity to change their original choice. Those 
in the neutral condition were asked “Which option would you choose?”, while those in 
the status quo condition were asked “Would you stay with your original selection?”. 
Results indicated that prevention-focused participants were more likely than promotion-
focused participants to stay with the status quo option and retain their original choice in 
the status quo condition, while promotion-focused participants were only marginally 
more likely to retain their original choice in the neutral condition. 
Given the aforementioned studies, it has been demonstrated that regulatory 
orientation impacts what we notice, look for, prioritize, and what we value. This is 
relevant in terms of regulatory fit. Individuals tend to place more value on things that 
they associate with their regulatory orientation. That is, individuals with a promotion 
focus are likely to prefer things that they associate with promotion-oriented end states, 
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 while those with a prevention focus are likely to prefer and/or be affected by things that 
they associate with prevention-oriented end state.  
Pursuant to these observations, this paper proposes the two main hypotheses: 
 H1: The more promotion-focused one is, the more positive product ratings will be 
if the brand name is associated with promotion concerns and strategies; and  
H2: The more prevention-focused one is, the more positive product ratings will be 
if the brand name is associated with prevention concerns and strategies.  
While not the primary foci of this paper, effects based on the following two hypotheses 
will also be examined:  
H3: As independent self-construal scores increase, the more likely it is that 
product ratings will be higher for brand names associated with promotion concerns and 
strategies; and  
H4: As interdependent self-construal scores increase, the more likely it is that 
product ratings will be higher for brand names associated with prevention concerns and 
strategies. 
Should the hypotheses find support, there are implications for their application in 
terms of marketing.  Marketers who sell products internationally will find it useful to 
customize brand names specific to regional cultures. This strategy could potentially 
enhance revenues and customer satisfaction, as customers will more strongly identify 
with such brand names. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
 
2.1 Participants 
 Participants consisted of 68 undergraduate Psychology students (17 male, 50 
female, 1 unknown). Students received course credit for their research participation. As 
an incentive for participation, students were also entered into a random drawing for a 
$100 gas card. This project was approved by the University’s Institutional Review Board. 
2.2 Design 
For the study, a one factor between-subjects design was implemented. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. There was no difference between 
conditions except that, in condition 2, those cars given a promotion-oriented name in 
condition 1 were given a prevention-oriented name in condition 2, and vice versa. The 
purpose of this was to counterbalance the brand name types assigned to each car. That is, 
each car would have an opportunity to be tested under both brand types (promotion vs. 
prevention). 
2.3 Measures and Materials 
 After signing an informed consent form, participants responded to three 
individual difference measures administered on a computer. These measures were 
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 administered to each participant in random order to control for potential order biases. The 
measures were: Promotion-Prevention Scale (Lockwood, Jordan, and Kunda, 2002), 
Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Idson, Ayduk, & Taylor, 
2001), and the Self-Construal Scale (Singelis, 1994). Both the Promotion-Prevention 
Scale and the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire were used to assess individual differences 
in terms of promotion and prevention. The Self-Construal Scale was included to measure 
individual differences in terms of independent and interdependent self-construal. 
2.3.1 Individual Difference Measures 
Promotion-Prevention Scale (Lockwood, Jordan, and Kunda, 2002). This scale 
consists of 18 items and was designed to test for individual differences in terms of 
promotion and prevention. It uses a 9-point scale (1 = Not at all true of me to 9 = Very 
true of me). An example promotion item is “I typically focus on the success I hope to 
achieve in the future”. An example prevention item is “I frequently think about how I can 
prevent failures in my life”. Reliabilities for the scale’s factors are as follow: promotion α 
= .81, prevention α = .75 (see Appendix A for complete version of measures). 
Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Idson, Ayduk, & 
Taylor, 2001). This questionnaire contains 11 items and is used to measure individual 
differences in terms of promotion and prevention. It uses a 5-point Likert-type scale. For 
questions 1 through 8, the anchors are as follow: 1 = never or seldom, 3 = sometimes, and 
5 = very often. For question 9: 1 = never true, 3 = sometimes true, and 5 = very often 
true. For questions 10 and 11: 1 = certainly false and 5 = certainly true. An example 
promotion item is “How often have you accomplished things that got you “psyched” to 
work even harder?”. An example prevention item is “How often did you obey rules and 
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 regulations that were established by your parents?”. Reliabilities for the scale’s factors 
are as follow: promotion α = .73, prevention α = .80 (see Appendix A). 
Self-Construal Scale (Singelis, 1994). This scale consists of 24 items and is used 
to measure individual differences in terms of independent and interdependent self-
construal. It uses a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly 
Agree). An example independent item is “I enjoy being unique and different from others 
in many respects”. An example interdependent item is “It is important for me to maintain 
harmony within my group”. Reliabilities for the scale’s factors are as follow: 
independence α = .70, interdependence α = .74 (see Appendix A). 
2.3.2 Ratings 
Car Ratings. For each of the 6 cars, 6 ratings questions were asked for the 
purpose of determining how cars of different brand types would be rated in relation to 
scores on the individual difference measures. For the car ratings, a 5-point scale was used 
(1 = Strongly Agree to 5 = Strongly Disagree). An example item is “I like this car” (see 
Appendix B.2). 
Team Ratings. For each of the 4 teams, 5 ratings questions were asked for the 
purpose of determining how teams of different brand types would be rated in relation to 
scores on the individual difference measures. For the team ratings, a 5-point scale was 
used (1 = Strongly Agree to 5 = Strongly Disagree). An example item is “This team name 
fits who I am” (see Appendix B.3). 
2.3.3 Recall Questions 
Recall Questions. Seven recall questions were asked for each of four cars that 
participants rated. Six of the questions were true/false questions and one was multiple 
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 choice. The multiple choice item was “What was the name of the car you just saw?”. An 
example true/false item is “This car has heated seats” (see Appendix B.5). 
2.3.4 Demographic Questions 
Demographic Questions. Six demographic questions were asked of participants 
(see Appendix B.6). 
2.4 Procedure 
Each participant was seated at an individual computer station. Participants 
completed a series of tasks on a computer. First, participants completed a series of 
individual difference measures sensitive to differences in regulatory focus and self-
construal (see Appendix A). The order of the measures was randomized for each 
participant (not the order of the items in them). After completing the measures, 
participants were informed that they would be viewing prototypes of new cars currently 
in development by manufacturers and that they would be asked to provide ratings for 
them. However, each car was assigned a hypothetical brand name that was not the actual 
name of the car. Each brand name assigned to a car was either promotion-oriented or 
prevention-oriented. That is, each brand name was associated with either promotion 
concerns, or prevention concerns.  
For each car, participants were presented with a picture of the car, the brand 
name, and information about the car’s features such as the number of airbags, 
entertainment ports, miles per gallon, acceleration, and length of warranty (see Appendix 
B.1). Three cars had a promotion-oriented brand name and three cars had a prevention-
oriented brand name. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In 
condition 1, participants were asked to give ratings for six hypothetical cars presented on 
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 the computer. Condition 2 was exactly like condition 1 except that the cars received the 
alternative name type. That is, those cars given a promotion-oriented name in condition 1 
were given a prevention-oriented name in condition 2. Conversely, those cars given a 
prevention-oriented name in condition 1 were given a promotion-oriented name in 
condition 2. So, the name types assigned to each car were counterbalanced across 
conditions. In both conditions, after viewing each car, participants were asked to provide 
a series of ratings before viewing the next car (see Appendix B.2). The purpose of these 
ratings was to determine how cars of different brand types (promotion vs. prevention) 
would be rated in relation to scores on the individual difference measures. 
 After the last car was rated, participants across both conditions were presented 
with a series of four hypothetical names for sports teams (see Appendix B.3). Participants 
were asked to imagine these as team names for Cleveland State University. Each team 
name was either promotion-oriented, or prevention-oriented. That is, each team name was 
associated with either promotion concerns, or prevention concerns. Two teams had a 
promotion-oriented name and two had a prevention-oriented name. On the computer, 
participants were presented with the name of a team. Team names were presented one at 
a time. For teams, switching the name types in condition 2 was not necessary as there 
were no photo stimuli presented for team names. Following each team name, participants 
were asked to provide a series of ratings for the team (see Appendix B.4). Similar to the 
car ratings, the purpose of these ratings was to determine how teams of differing brand 
types (promotion vs. prevention) would be rated in relation to scores on the individual 
difference measures. 
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  After the last team was rated, participants were asked a series of recall questions 
about cars they were presented with in the first part of the study (see Appendix B.5). This 
set of questions was exploratory. The purpose of these questions was to examine the 
possibility that people’s recall performance might be based on specific individual 
differences. For example, someone high in promotion might have better recall of 
information about cars with promotion brand names compared to cars with prevention 
brand names. Conversely, someone high in prevention might have better recall of 
information about cars with prevention brand names compared to cars with promotion 
brand names. Also for examination was the possibility that promotion-oriented names 
might relate to better recall of promotion-oriented car features while prevention-oriented 
names might relate to better recall of prevention-oriented features. For example, 
promotion-oriented names might relate to better recall of features such as heated seats, 
while prevention-oriented names might relate to better recall of features such as airbags. 
After this set of questions, participants were asked demographic questions (see Appendix 
B.6), then debriefed. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
3.1 Random Assignment Effectiveness 
 To determine whether random assignment was effective, it was necessary to 
examine trait scores across conditions to show there were no unintentional differences 
between conditions from the onset. The four composite scores that were examined to test 
the effectiveness of the random assignment procedure were: promotion (PPS), prevention 
(PPS), independent (Self-Construal Scale), and interdependent (Self-Construal Scale). To 
make the comparisons, one-way ANOVA’s were conducted using the individual 
difference composite scores as the dependent variables and condition as the independent 
variable. Results indicated that there were no significant differences between scores 
across the condition levels (promotion, p = .38; prevention, p = .48; independent, p = .38; 
interdependent, p = .57), suggesting  random assignment was effective. 
3.2 Promotion-Prevention Scale 
 This scale had two factors: promotion and prevention. For the promotion factor, 
the range of scores was from 47 to 81 (M = 70.81, SD = 7.70) with a median of 72.5 and 
α = .81. For the prevention factor, the range of scores was from 16 to 73 (M = 49.63, SD 
= 11.61) with a median of 51.5 and α = .73. 
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 3.3 Regulatory Focus Questionnaire 
 This scale had two factors: promotion and prevention. For the promotion factor, 
the range of scores was from 15 to 30 (M = 22.69, SD = 3.30) with a median of 22 and α 
= .64. For the prevention factor, the range of scores was from 7 to 25 (M = 16.63, SD = 
3.58) with a median of 17 and α = .79. 
3.4 Self-Construal Scale 
 This scale had two factors: independent self-construal and interdependent self-
construal. For the independent factor, the range of scores was from 42 to 84 (M = 63.29, 
SD = 8.27) with a median of 63 and α = .71. For the interdependence factor, the range of 
scores was from 31 to 81 (M = 60.96, SD = 8.95) with a median of 62 and α = .76. 
3.5 Factor Correlations 
 
Several correlations were examined to help determine the validity of the measures 
used. A correlation analysis (promotion and prevention) conducted for the Promotion-
Prevention Scale (PPS) demonstrated significance (r = .34, p < .01), as expected based on 
previous research (e.g., Higgins, 1987). So, the promotion and prevention factor scores 
were moderately correlated, but not perfectly correlated. Consistent with theory and 
research (e.g., Higgins, 1987), this positive correlation between promotion and 
prevention scores supports the notion that these are independent constructs and are not 
opposite ends of a unidimensional factor. This significant correlation also meant that in 
analyses dealing with promotion as a predictor, prevention was controlled for, and vice 
versa. This statistical strategy is consistent with conventional approaches (e.g., Strachman 
& Gable, 2006). Unlike the PPS, the promotion and prevention factors for the Regulatory 
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 Focus Questionnaire (RFQ) were not significantly correlated (r = .14, p = .25). 
Implications of this will be discussed shortly.  
For the Self-Construal Scale (SCS), the correlation between its independent and 
interdependent factors was examined. The correlation was not significant (r = .11, p = 
.37). What was expected and consistent with theory and research was that these factors 
(independent and interdependent) would have significant correlations with promotion and 
prevention, respectively (Lee et al., 2000). First, the independent factor of the SCS had a 
significant correlation with the promotion factor of the PPS (r = .40, p < .01). Second, the 
interdependent factor of the SCS had the same significant correlation with the prevention 
factor of the PPS (r = .40, p < .01). Given these results, the SCS measure demonstrated 
validity. An analysis of correlations between factors of the RFQ and those of the SCS, 
however, did not yield significant relationships. Specifically, the promotion factor of the 
RFQ did not significantly correlate with the independence factor of the SCS (r = -.04, p = 
.77), nor did the prevention factor of the RFQ significantly correlation with the 
interdependence factor of the SCS (r = -.07, p = .57). Given the lack of any significant 
correlations for factors of the RFQ that were expected, this measure was not used in 
subsequent analyses for this study. Instead, promotion and prevention scores from the 
PPS were used in analyses since this measure demonstrated both reliability and validity 
(See Table 1). 
3.6 Car Analysis Preparation  
To prepare for analyses of the car ratings, composite variables representing 
attitudes for each car were created. Given that five of the six ratings questions used a 
Likert-type scale (See Appendix B), composites were created based on five of the  
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    ppprom ppprev scsi scsc 
ppprom Pearson Correlation α = .81 .343(**) .399(**) .077
  Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .001 .535
  N 68 68 68 68
ppprev Pearson Correlation .343(**) α = .73 .009 .401(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .939 .001
  N 68 68 68 68
scsi Pearson Correlation .399(**) .009 α = .71 .109
  Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .939  .374
  N 68 68 68 68
scsc Pearson Correlation .077 .401(**) .109 α = .76
  Sig. (2-tailed) .535 .001 .374 
  N 68 68 68 68
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table I: Factor Correlations and Reliabilities 
 
questions, while the sixth question (“Enter a value between $10,000 and $50,000, using 
$1,000 increments, that is the most you would be willing to pay for this car”) was 
analyzed separately. To create the composite variables, responses for rating questions one 
through five were added together to produce an attitude composite rating for a given car. 
For example, if a participant’s responses for the first five questions relating to car 1 were 
4, 3, 2, 3, 2, then the value for the car 1 composite variable would have been 14 for this 
case. As there were six cars, six composite variables were created (each one representing 
ratings for questions one through five for each car).  
Then, to evaluate the reliability of the composites, it was necessary to conduct a 
reliability analysis for each composite variable. In the order of the composite variables 
(one through six), the alpha values were as follow: .88, .84, .91, .93, .89, and .81. It 
should be noted that, for car 6, an alternate composite was created which used only 
questions one through four, as it had a higher reliability (α = .90) than the original 
composite (α = .81). So, two composites were created for car 6. Given the 
aforementioned values, the composite variables were found to be reliable. 
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 Each composite variable was, in turn, used as a dependent variable in subsequent 
analyses. Specifically, the analyses were conducted using a 2 condition (brand type: 
promotion vs. prevention) X 2 (trait: high vs. low) between-subjects design. Recall, all 
participants were presented with images and information pertaining to six different cars 
presented in the same order. In condition 1, the car participants saw first had a prevention 
name, while those in condition 2 saw the exact same car and specs, but the first car in 
condition 2 had a promotion name. So, in the condition portion of the aforementioned 
ANOVA, the brand names were promotion vs. prevention. In terms of the trait factors, 
those analyzed were promotion (high vs. low), prevention (high vs. low), independent 
self-construal (high vs. low), and interdependent self-construal (high vs. low). For a given 
factor, (i.e., promotion), a median score was computed across cases and a median split 
was created based on that score. Therefore, scores below the median were treated as 
“low” for that factor, while scores above the median were treated as “high” for that 
factor. When categorizing participants based on the median split, there were six instances 
in which participants had the median score on the independent self-construal factor. Thus, 
for categorical analyses involving independent self-construal, data from these six 
participants were not used (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). The factors 
were based on scores for specific measures. The promotion and prevention factors were 
based on promotion and prevention scores on the Promotion-Prevention Scale 
(Lockwood et al., 2002). The independent and interdependent factors were based on 
independence and interdependence scores Self-Construal Scale (Singelis, 1994).   
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 3.7 Car Ratings (Overall) 
For the first car presented, those in condition 1 were exposed to a car with a 
prevention brand name while those in condition 2 were exposed to a car with a promotion 
brand name. To test for promotion-focus fit effects (e.g., significant interaction effects), 
the attitude composite variable for car 1 was used as a dependent variable while 
promotion scores (median split: high vs. low) and condition (brand type: promotion vs. 
prevention) were treated as independent variables. Prevention scores were entered as a 
covariate. A significant interaction was found, F(1, 66) = 4.77, p < .03. To interpret this 
interaction, subsequent analyses were performed. Before these analyses could be 
performed, it was necessary to create a new variable with four levels representing 
combinations of promotion scores (median split: high vs. low) and condition (brand type: 
promotion vs. prevention). Specifically, the four levels were: 1.) low promotion score, 
brand type promotion, 2.) high promotion score, brand type promotion, 3.) low promotion 
score, brand type prevention, and 4.) high promotion score, brand type prevention. With 
this new variable, a one-way ANOVA was performed including Tukey post-hoc 
contrasts. The one-way ANOVA was significant, F(3, 66) = 3.53, p < .02 and the post-
hoc contrasts demonstrated (unexpectedly) that people high in promotion were 
significantly more favorable towards the car when it had a prevention name (M = 15.88, 
SD = 5.31) compared to when it had a promotion name (M = 11.18, SD = 3.56), p = .01. 
To test for prevention-focus fit effects, the attitude composite variable for car 1 was used 
as a dependent variable, while prevention scores (median split: high vs. low) and 
condition (brand type: promotion vs. prevention) were treated as independent variables. 
Promotion scores were entered as a covariate. A significant interaction was found, F(1, 
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 66) = 4.96, p < .03. To interpret this interaction, subsequent analyses were performed. 
Similar to the previous promotion-fit scenario, before these analyses could be performed, 
it was necessary to create a new variable with four levels. This time, the new variable 
represented combinations of prevention scores (median split: high vs. low) and condition 
(brand type: promotion vs. prevention). Specifically, the four levels were: 1.) low 
prevention score, brand type promotion, 2.) high prevention score, brand type promotion, 
3.) low prevention score, brand type prevention, and 4.) high prevention score, brand type 
prevention. With this new variable, a one-way ANOVA was performed including Tukey 
post-hoc contrasts. The one-way ANOVA was significant, F(3, 66) = 3.30, p < .03. In 
support of H2, post-hoc contrasts demonstrated that people high in prevention were more 
favorable towards the car when it had a prevention name (M = 15.63, SD = 4.05) 
compared to when it had a promotion name (M = 11.00, SD = 4.19), p = .01. So, there 
was evidence of prevention-fit. To test for independent and interdependent self-construal 
fit effects, procedures similar to the aforementioned were utilized and no significant 
effects were found (see Appendix C, Tables 7 and 8). 
For the second car presented, those in condition 1 were exposed to a car with a 
promotion brand name while those in condition 2 were exposed to a car with a prevention 
brand name. Promotion-focus fit effects were tested for as described in the analyses for 
the first car. That is, the attitude composite variable for car 2 was used as a dependent 
variable, while promotion scores (median split: high vs. low) and condition (brand type: 
promotion vs. prevention) were treated as independent variables as independent variables. 
Prevention scores were entered as a covariate. A marginally significant interaction was 
found, F(1, 66) = 4.77, p = .05. To interpret this interaction, subsequent analyses were 
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 performed. As before, a new variable was created with four levels. In this case, the four 
levels represented combinations of promotion scores (median split: high vs. low) and 
condition (brand type: promotion vs. prevention). Specifically, the four levels were: 1.) 
low promotion score, brand type promotion, 2.) high promotion score, brand type 
promotion, 3.) low promotion score, brand type prevention, and 4.) high promotion score, 
brand type prevention. With this new variable, a one-way ANOVA was performed 
including Tukey post-hoc contrasts. The one-way ANOVA was not significant, F(3, 66) 
= 1.58, p = .20, nor were any of the Tukey contrasts. So, no promotion-fit effect was 
found. To test for prevention, independent self-construal, and interdependent self-
construal fit effects, procedures similar to the aforementioned were utilized and no 
significant effects were found (see Appendix C, Tables 10, 11, and 12). Also, for the next 
two cars presented (cars 3 and 4), no significant fit effects were found in any case (see 
Appendix C, Tables 13 thru 20). 
For car 5, those in condition 1 were shown a car with a prevention brand name 
while those in condition 2 were exposed to a car with a promotion brand name. In testing 
for promotion and prevention-fit effects, no significant results were found (see Appendix, 
Tables 21 and 22). In testing for independent-fit effects (with interdependent self-
construal entered as a covariate), the attitude composite variable for car 5 was used as a 
dependent variable while independent self-construal scores (median split: high vs. low) 
and condition (brand type: promotion vs. prevention) were treated as independent 
variables. A significant interaction was found, F(1, 60) = 10.00, p < .01. To interpret this 
interaction, subsequent analyses were performed. As before, a new variable was created 
with four levels. In this case, the four levels represented combinations of independent 
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 self-construal scores (median split: high vs. low) and condition (brand type: promotion 
vs. prevention). Specifically, the four levels were: 1.) low independent self-construal 
score, brand type promotion, 2.) high independent self-construal score, brand type 
promotion, 3.) low independent self-construal score, brand type prevention, and 4.) high 
independent self-construal score, brand type prevention. With this new variable, a one-
way ANOVA was performed including Tukey post-hoc contrasts. The one-way ANOVA 
was significant, F(1, 60) = 3.71, p < .02. Post hoc analyses demonstrated that in support 
of H3, people high in independent self-construal were more favorable towards car 5 when 
it had a promotion name (M = 16.18, SD = 4.53) compared to when it had a prevention 
name (M = 12.00, SD = 3.36), p < .04. So, there was evidence of independent-fit. Similar 
testing did not reveal evidence of interdependent-fit (see Appendix, Table 24).    
For car 6, those in condition 1 were presented a car with a promotion brand name 
while those in condition 2 were presented a car with a prevention brand name. In testing 
for promotion-fit effects (with prevention entered as a covariate), a significant interaction 
was found, F(1, 66) = 4.62, p < .04. A subsequent one-way ANOVA, however, was not 
significant, F(3, 66) = 1.55, p = .21, nor were any of the Tukey contrasts. So, no 
promotion-fit effect was found. Similar testing did not reveal evidence of prevention, 
independent, or interdependent fit effects (see Appendix, Tables 26, 27, and 28). 
The results described above were based primarily on composites that were created 
from questions one through five. As described earlier, question six was treated separately, 
as its responses used a different scale. So, analyses for the cars in terms of question six 
were treated separately from the previous analyses. Promotion, prevention, independent 
self-construal, and interdependent self-construal were entered as covariates depending on 
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 which of these variables was used as an IV. For instance, in cases where promotion was 
an IV, prevention was entered as the covariate, and vice versa. Similar to previous 
analyses, condition (brand type: promotion vs. prevention) served as an IV in all 
analyses.  
For cars 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, significant interactions were found in examining for 
promotion or prevention fit effects, but subsequent analyses proved non-siginificant. No 
significant interactions were found for any of these cars when examining for independent 
or interdependent fit effects. For car 3, no significant interactions were found in any case.  
3.8 Car Ratings (Per Question) 
To further assess effects, it was necessary to analyze not only overall car ratings 
as aforementioned, but also ratings for each question asked. Again, the analyses were 
conducted using a 2 (factor: high vs. low) x 2 condition (brand type: promotion vs. 
prevention) between-subjects design. Factors analyzed were promotion (high vs. low), 
prevention (high vs. low), independence (high vs. low), and interdependence (high vs. 
low). Again, factors were entered as covariates depending on which variable was used as 
an IV. For example, in cases where promotion was an IV, prevention was entered as the 
covariate, and vice versa. Similar to previous analyses, condition (brand type: e.g., 
promotion vs. prevention) served as an IV in all analyses. Fit effects were examined 
using the same methods as described previously for overall car ratings, including the use 
of four-level variables for contrasts, and post-hoc analyses. For the per question car 
ratings, the clearest way to talk about these supplementary results is to focus on what 
came out as significant.  
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 For car 1, there were some significant findings. In examining for promotion-fit in 
question 1 (“I like this car.”), a near significant interaction between promotion and 
condition was found, F(1, 66) = 3.52, p = .07. A subsequent one-way ANOVA was also 
near significant, F(3, 66) = 2.64, p = .06 and, unexpectedly, post hoc analyses revealed 
that people high in promotion rated the car higher when it carried the prevention brand 
name (M = 3.29, SD = 1.26) than they did when it carried the promotion brand name (M 
= 2.24, SD = 0.97),  p < .04. Second, for question 2 (“It is easy for me to imagine myself 
owning this car.”), a significant interaction was found between promotion and condition, 
F(1, 66) = 5.83, p < .02. A subsequent one-way ANOVA was significant, F(3, 66) = 3.30, 
p < .03. Similar to question 1, post hocs unexpectedly revealed that people high in 
promotion rated the car significantly higher in terms of their ability to imagine 
themselves owning it when it had a prevention name (“Precision”) (M = 2.83, SD = 1.19) 
than they did when it had a promotion brand name (“Prospect”) (M = 1.71, SD = 0.77), p 
< .01. A similar effect was revealed for question 3 (“This car fits my personality.”). In 
addition to the interaction found between promotion and condition, F(1, 66) = 6.20, p < 
.02, a one-way ANOVA was significant, F(3, 66) = 4.69, p < .01, and contrasts showed 
people high in promotion rated the car significantly higher in terms of personality fit 
when it had a prevention name (“Precision”) (M = 2.71, SD = 1.21) than they did when it 
had a promotion name (“Prospect”) (M = 1.59, SD = 1.71), p < .01. Again, the findings of 
the aforementioned contrasts were not expected. 
While there was no promotion-fit for car 1, there was near significance in the 
direction of prevention-fit. For question 3 (“This car fits my personality.”), there was a 
near significant interaction between prevention and condition, F(1, 66) = 3.29, p = .08. 
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 While the aforementioned interaction was only near significant, a subsequent one-way 
ANOVA proved significant, F(3, 66) = 3.31, p < .03, and post hoc contrasts showed that  
people high in prevention tended to rate the car higher in terms of personality fit when it 
had a prevention name (M = 2.63, SD = 1.02) than they did when it had a promotion 
name (M = 1.67, SD = 0.84), F(1, 66) = 3.31, p < .02. Finally, for question 6 (“Enter a 
value between $10,000 and $50,000, using $1,000 increments, that is the most you would 
be willing to pay for this car”), there were significant interactions between promotion and 
condition F(1, 66) = 5.10, p < .03 and prevention and condition F(1, 66) = 5.46, p < .02. 
However, subsequent analyses were not significant.  
 For car 2, question 2 (“It is easy for me to imagine myself owning this car.”), a 
significant interaction was found between promotion and condition, F(1, 66) = 5.59, p < 
.02. A subsequent one-way ANOVA proved marginally significant, F(3, 66) = 2.19, p = 
.05 (one-tailed test). Contrasts were also marginally significant and demonstrated  that, in 
the direction of support of H1, respondents high in promotion tended to rate the car 
higher in terms of their ability to imagine themselves owning it when it had a promotion 
name (“VIP”) (M = 2.76, SD = 1.15) than they did when it had a prevention name 
(“Imperative”) (M = 2.00, SD = 0.87), p = .06 (one-tailed test). For question 4 (“I would 
enjoy driving this car.”), there was a significant interaction between promotion and 
condition, F(1, 66) = 5.05, p < .03, but a subsequent one-way ANOVA to conduct 
contrasts between high promotion in the promotion vs. prevention conditions was 
nonsignificant, F(3, 66) = 1.68, p = .18.  For question 6 (“Enter a value between $10,000 
and $50,000, using $1,000 increments, that is the most you would be willing to pay for 
this car”), there was a significant interaction between prevention and condition, F(1, 66) 
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 = 4.56, p < .04, but a subsequent one-way ANOVA to conduct contrasts between high 
promotion in the promotion vs. prevention conditions was nonsignificant, (F(3, 66) = 
1.42, p = .25). 
 For car 5, there were also significant findings. For question 1 (“I like this car.”), a 
marginally significant interaction was found between independent self-construal and 
condition, F(1, 60) = 4.17, p = .05. A subsequent one-way ANOVA demonstrated 
marginal significance, F(3, 60) = 2.28, p < .05 (one-tailed test), while post-hoc analyses 
revealed that, in support of H3, people high in independent self-construal rated the car 
significantly higher when it had a promotion name (“VIP”) (M = 3.35, SD = 1.11) than 
they did when it had a prevention name (“Imperative”) (M = 2.33, SD = 1.11), p < .03 
(one-tailed test). So, there was evidence of independent fit. For question 3 (“This car fits 
my personality.”), a significant interaction was found between independent self-construal 
and condition, F(1, 60) = 10.53, p < .01. A subsequent one-way ANOVA to conduct 
contrasts between high independent self-construal scores in the promotion vs. prevention 
conditions was significant, F(3, 60) = 3.72, p < .01 (one-tailed test). Post hoc analyses 
demonstrated that, in support of H3, people high in independent self-construal rated the 
car significantly higher in terms of personality fit when it had a promotion name (“VIP”) 
(M = 2.88, SD = 1.22) than they did when it had a prevention name (“Imperative”) (M = 
1.87, SD = 0.83),  p <.02 (one-tailed test). Question 4 (“I would enjoy driving this car.”) 
demonstrated a similar pattern of results A significant interaction was found between 
independent self-construal and condition, F(1, 60) = 13.96, p < .01. A subsequent one-
way ANOVA was significant, F(3, 60) = 4.96, p < .01 (one-tailed test). Post hoc analyses 
demonstrated that in support of H3, people high in independent self-construal rated the 
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 car significantly higher in terms of personality fit when it had a promotion name (“VIP”) 
(M = 3.35, SD = 1.06) than they did when it had a prevention name (“Imperative”) (M = 
2.71, SD = 0.91),  p < .01 (one-tailed test).  
3.9 Team Analysis Preparation 
To begin analyses of the team ratings, it was necessary to create composite 
variables for each team. To create the composite variables, responses for the five ratings 
questions were added together to produce a total rating for a given team. For example, if 
a participant’s responses for the questions relating to team 1 were 3, 4, 1, 2, 2, then the 
value for the car 1 composite variable would have been 12 for this case. As there were 
four teams, four composite variables were created. Then, to evaluate the reliability of the 
composites, it was necessary to conduct a reliability analysis for each composite variable. 
In the order of the composite variables (one through four), the alpha values were as 
follow: .85, .94, .90, and .92. Given the aforementioned values, the composite variables 
were found to be reliable. 
Each composite variable was, in turn, used as a dependent variable in subsequent 
analyses. However, sports teams were analyzed differently from the way the cars were 
analyzed. Given that the names of sports teams presented did not appear with photo 
stimuli, it was not necessary to counterbalance the brand types between conditions. The 
brand type for a given team was the same across conditions. For example, in condition 1, 
team 1 was the “Visionaries” (promotion brand), and in condition 2, it was the same 
name. Given that there was no variation in the brand type for a given team, a 2 x 2 
ANOVA would not have been an appropriate analysis to test the hypotheses for sports 
teams. Instead, regression equations were used. In the equations, the four factors 
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 (promotion, prevention, independent self-construal, and interdependent self-construal) 
were used to predict ratings. There were two equations used. Specifically, promotion and 
prevention scores served as the predictors in one equation, while independent and 
interdependent self-construal scores served as the predictors in another equation. 
3.10 Team Ratings (Overall) 
 In some instances, scores (promotion, prevention, independence, 
interdependence) were able to significantly or near significantly predict overall ratings 
for sports teams. For team 1 (“Visionaries”), promotion scores were marginally 
significant (in support of H1) in their ability to predict ratings (β = .215, t(64) = 1.70, p = 
.05, one-tailed test) and the collective ability of both predictors (promotion and 
prevention) to explain a significant portion of the variance in ratings was significant, R2 = 
.078, F(1, 64) = 2.74, p = .04 (one-tailed test). In addition, while independent and 
interdependent self-construal were not able to explain a significant portion of the variance 
in ratings, R2 = .048, F(1, 64) = 1.65, p = .20, interdependent self-construal was near 
significant in its ability to predict ratings for team 1 (β = .221, t(64) = 1.82, p = .08). For 
team 2 (“Guardians”), independent (β = -.271, t(64) = -2.41, p < .01) and interdependent 
self-construal scores (in support of H4) (β = .367, t(64) = 3.26, p < .01) scores 
significantly predicted ratings for the team and were collectively able to explain a 
significant portion of the variance in ratings, R2 = .186, F(1, 64) = 7.43, p < .01. For team 
3 (“Pioneers”), only interdependent self-construal scores significantly predicted ratings (β 
= .262, t(64) = 2.20, p < .03), while independent and interdependent self-construal were 
marginally significant in their ability to explain variance in the ratings, R2 = .087, F(1, 64) 
= 3.12, p = .05. There were no effects for team 4 (“Citizens”). 
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 3.11 Team Ratings (Per Question) 
 Similar to overall team ratings, there were some cases of significant or near 
significant predictions in terms of specific questions. For team 1 (“Visionaries”), question 
1 (“I like this team name.”), prevention scores were near significant in their ability to 
predict ratings (β = .231, t(64) = 1.81, p = .08), but the collective ability of both 
predictors (promotion and prevention) to explain a significant portion of the variance in 
ratings was nonsignificant, R2 = .063, F(1, 64) = 2.20, p = .12). For question 3 (“I would 
be willing to wear clothing with this CSU team name.”), neither promotion, nor 
prevention scores were significant in their ability to predict ratings, but the collective 
ability of both IV’s (promotion and prevention) to explain a significant portion of the 
variance in ratings was near significant, R2 = .081, F(1, 64) = 2.86, p =.06. For the same 
question, interdependent self-construal scores were marginally significant in their ability 
to predict ratings (β = .243, t(64) = 2.01, p = .05), but the collective ability of both 
predictors (independent and interdependent self-construal) to explain a significant portion 
of the variance in ratings was nonsignificant, R2 = .059, F(1, 64) = 2.03, p = .14. For 
question 4 (“I would identify with CSU if it had this team name.”), promotion scores 
were significant in their ability to predict ratings (β = .226, t(64) = 1.77, p < .04, one-
tailed test) (in support of H1), but the collective ability of both predictors (promotion and 
prevention) to explain a significant portion of the variance in ratings was only near 
significant, R2 = .064, F(1, 64) = 2.22, p = .06 (one-tailed test). For  question 5 
(“Assuming I had the money, I would be willing to donate to CSU in the future if it had 
this team name.”), promotion scores were significant in their ability predict ratings (β = 
.268, t(64) = 2.12, p < .02, one-tailed test) (in support of H1), and the collective ability of 
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 both predictors (promotion and prevention) to explain a significant portion of the 
variance in ratings was only near significance, R2 = .081, F(1, 64) = 2.86, p < .03 (one-
tailed test). 
 For team 2 (“Guardians”), the results were highly significant across all five rating 
questions in support of H4, specifically in cases where independent and interdependent 
self-construal were the predictors. All values for p were based on a one-tailed test (see 
Tables 2, 3, and 4). For the same question, interdependent self-construal scores were near 
significant in their ability to predict ratings (β = .230, t(64) = 1.90, p = .06), but the 
collective ability of both predictors (independent and interdependent self-construal) to 
explain a significant portion of the variance in ratings was nonsignificant, R2 = .054, F(1, 
64) = 1.84, p = .17. For question 4 (“I would identify with CSU if it had this team 
name.”), interdependent self-construal scores were significant in their ability to predict 
ratings (β = .279, t(64) = 2.33, p < .02), and the collective ability of both predictors 
(independent and interdependent self- construal) to explain a significant portion of the 
variance in ratings was near significant, R2 = .079, F(1, 64) = 2.80, p = .07. For the same 
question, interdependent (β = .417, t(64) = 3.79, p < .01) self-construal scores 
significantly predicted ratings, while independent (β = .181, t(64) = 1.64, p = .05, one-
tailed test) self-construal scores (in the direction of support of H3) marginally predicted 
ratings. Both predictors (independent and interdependent self-construal) collectively 
explained a significant portion of the variance in the ratings, R2 = .223, F(1, 64) = 9.32, p 
< .01.  
For team 4 (“Citizens”), there were some near significant findings. For question 5 
(“Assuming I had the money, I would be willing to donate to CSU in the future if it had  
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 Question β t p 
“I like this team name.” -.287 -2.47 .01 
“This team name fits who I am.” -.260 -2.24 .02 
“I would be willing to wear clothing with 
this CSU team name.” 
-.362 -3.25 .00 
“I would identify with CSU if it had this 
team name.” 
-.265 -2.37 .01 
“Assuming I had the money, I would be 
willing to donate to CSU in the future if it 
had this team name.” 
-.050 -.44 .33 
 
Table II: Independent Self-Construal 
 
 
Question β t p 
“I like this team name.” .260 2.23 .02 
“This team name fits who I am.” .285 2.46 .01 
“I would be willing to wear clothing with 
this CSU team name.” 
.309 2.77 .01 
“I would identify with CSU if it had this 
team name.” 
.384 3.43 .00 
“Assuming I had the money, I would be 
willing to donate to CSU in the future if it 
had this team name.” 
.402 3.52 .00 
 
Table III: Interdependent Self-Construal 
 
 
Question Predictor(s) R2 F(1,64) p 
“I like this team name.” Ind / Inter .133 5.00 .01
“This team name fits who I am.” Ind / Inter .133 4.98 .01
“I would be willing to wear clothing with 
this CSU team name.” 
Ind / Inter .202 8.22 .00
“I would identify with CSU if it had this 
team name.” 
Ind / Inter .195 7.88 .00
“Assuming I had the money, I would be 
willing to donate to CSU in the future if it 
had this team name.” 
Ind / Inter .160 6.19 .00
 
Table IV: Variance Explained by Independent and Interdependent Self-Construal 
this team name.”), prevention scores were near significant in their ability to predict 
ratings (β = .194, t(64) = 1.50, p = .07, one-tailed test), but the collective ability of both 
predictors (promotion and prevention) to explain a significant portion of the variance in 
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 ratings was not significant, R2 = .057, F(1, 64) = 1.96, p = .14 (one-tailed test). For the 
same question, interdependent self-construal scores were significant in their ability 
predict ratings (β = .283, t(64) = 2.38, p < .01, one-tailed test), and the collective ability 
of both predictors (independent and interdependent self-construal) to explain a significant 
portion of the variance in ratings was also significant, R2 = .086, F(1, 64) = 3.04, p < .03 
(one-tailed test). Given that the beta value for interdependent self-construal was in the 
expected direction (positive), the results for this rating were in support of H4. 
3.12 Exploratory Analyses 
3.12.1 Recall 
 
 For the recall task, there were few significant interactions across questions. For 
car 2, question 4 (“This car has a speed of 0 to 60 in 12 seconds.”), there was a 
marginally significant interaction between prevention and condition, F(1, 66) = 3.96, p = 
.05. A subsequent one-way ANOVA was near significant, F(1, 66) = 2.45, p = .07, and 
post hoc analyses confirmed that those high in prevention tended to have better recall of 
speed when the car had a promotion name (M =  0.94, SD = 0.25) than they did when it 
had a prevention name (M = 0.56, SD = .05), p = .08.   
 Car 6 had a significant finding. For question 4 (“This car has a speed of 0 to 60 in 
13 seconds.”), there was a significant interaction between interdependent self-construal 
and condition, F(1, 66) = 12.20, p < .01. A subsequent one-way ANOVA was significant, 
F(3, 66) = 4.17, p < .01, and post hoc analyses confirmed that those high in 
interdependent self-construal recalled speed significantly better when the car had a 
promotion name (M = 0.69, SD = 0.48) than they did when it had a prevention name (M = 
0.21, SD = 0.42), p < .03. 
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 Those high in interdependent self-construal and prevention tended to have better 
recall about promotion-branded cars than they did about prevention-branded cars.  
3.12.2 Reaction Times 
Reaction times were also examined. Reaction time was defined as the amount of 
time (in milliseconds) that participants spent viewing each car photo, brand name, and 
features before moving on to the ratings questions for that car. For example, people high 
in promotion might spend more time viewing a promotion-branded car than a prevention-
branded car. Again, the analyses were conducted using a 2 condition (brand type: 1 vs. 2) 
X 2 (factor: high vs. low) between-subjects design. Factors analyzed were promotion 
(high vs. low), prevention (high vs. low), independent self-construal (high vs. low), and 
interdependent self-construal (high vs. low). Again, factors were entered as covariates as 
appropriate. 
In terms of reaction times across cars, there was one significant finding. For car 2, 
there was a significant interaction between promotion and condition, F(1, 66) = 4.78, p < 
.03. A subsequent one-way ANOVA was significant, F(3, 66) = 3.40, p < .02, and post 
hoc analyses confirmed that those high in promotion had significantly longer reaction 
times when the car had a promotion name (M = 16357.76, SD = 10668.82) than they did 
when it had a prevention name (M = 9346.71, SD = 3760.24), p < .01. In sum, reaction 
times generally did not appear to have any relation to individual differences. 
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CHAPTER IV 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Consistent with the predictions, all four hypotheses demonstrated some instances 
of support. Support for H1 was found in overall ratings for team 1. This hypothesis was 
also supported in individual rating questions for car 2 and team 1. So, the results 
demonstrated that the more promotion-focused one is, the more positive product ratings 
will be if the brand name is associated with promotion concerns and strategies. H2 found 
support in overall ratings for car 1 and individual rating questions for car 1. So, these 
results supported the hypothesis that the more prevention-focused one is, the more 
positive product ratings will be if the brand name is associated with prevention concerns 
and strategies. Evidence for H3 was found in overall ratings for car 5 and individual 
rating questions for car 5 and team 3. Given this, support was found for the hypothesis 
that as independent self-construal scores increase, the more likely it is that product ratings 
will be higher for brand names associated with promotion concerns and strategies. 
Finally, support for H4 was found both in overall ratings for team 2 and across all 
individual rating questions for team 2. So, the results showed that as interdependent self-
construal scores increase, the more likely it is that product ratings will be higher for brand 
names associated with prevention concerns and strategies. These aforementioned  
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 demonstrations of support make sense given theory. For instance, given promotion’s 
association with ideals (Higgins, 1997), it is reasonable that when brand names are 
associated with ideals, their perceived value, through “transfer” (Cesario et al., 2004), can 
be projected onto products bearing such names. It also makes sense that this transfer of 
value can result in “fit” (Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003; Higgins, Idson, Freitas, 
Spiegel, & Molden, 2003) the more a person’s regulatory orientation (e.g., promotion) 
matches the types of associations (e.g. hedonic/promotion vs. utilitarian/prevention). he 
or she derives from a product.  
While there was certainly support for the hypotheses, there were also some 
unexpected results. For instance, when car 1 had a prevention name (“Precision”), people 
rated it significantly higher than when it had the promotion name (“Prospect”). This 
effect existed not accounting for participant scores on individual differences (promotion, 
prevention, independent self-construal, and interdependent self-construal). Given this, it 
appears that the name “Precision” may be both promotion and prevention-valenced. Cars 
bearing the name were rated higher by persons who were high in promotion and/or 
prevention than by those who were low in these differences. This main effect and its 
implications were not expected. On the one hand, it is clear why “Precision” would be a 
prevention-oriented name, as it implies the act of avoiding negative outcomes (misses, 
errors). However, it is not clear why this same brand name would have a promotion 
orientation. It could be that, from a promotion perspective, the name “Precision” might 
directly represent an ideal, rather than implying an act of avoiding negative outcomes as 
in the prevention perspective. So, it could be the case that certain terms could be 
associated with both promotion and prevention. If this is so, then such terms could be 
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 used as brands to cast a wider marketing net. That, brand names that carry both 
promotion and prevention association could be used by marketers to appeal to a broader 
base of consumers.However, such possibilities would bear further investigation. 
While car 1’s results were unexpected, car 5 yielded some support for H3 when it 
had a promotion (“VIP”) name. Though results indicated that the car was sensitive to 
independent self-construal, it was not clear why the car was not sensitive to any of the 
other three differences (promotion, prevention, and interdependent self-construal). 
Interestingly, car 2, question 2 (“It is easy for me to imagine myself owning this car.”) 
also showed more favorable ratings when it had a “VIP” name, but it was sensitive to 
promotion in support of H1. 
In terms of sports teams, given team 2’s consistent support of H4 across all its 
ratings, it was obviously very sensitive to interdependence and its ratings were 
significantly predicted by it. Of all the cars and sports teams used in this study, team 2 
demonstrated the most consistent support for any of the hypotheses by far. However, it 
should be acknowledged that, overall, support for the hypotheses was not consistent. 
Ideally, given theory, support for the hypotheses was expected to appear across all 
ratings.  
4.1 Limitations and Future Directions 
While there was some support for the hypotheses, it was not consistent. The lack 
of consistent support for the hypotheses could have been for any one or more of the 
following reasons: 1.) confounding variables (unknown) could have negatively affected 
the sensitivity of the cars and teams to the concepts being examined, 2.) more data is 
needed for the hypotheses to consistently demonstrate support, and/or 3.) The car and 
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 team names chosen for the study should have been more extreme examples of their 
respective orientations (promotion vs. prevention) and self-construals (independence vs. 
interdependence) in order to more sensitively measure the effects of these subtle 
concepts.   
Given the results of this study, it appears that there is much more research needed 
in order to better understand the relationships between brand types, individual 
differences, and consumer perceptions. While this study demonstrated some effects 
indicating that brand types actually matter to consumers, perhaps brand types are not as 
black and white as the hypotheses suggested. Specifically, it may be overly simplistic to 
posit that a given brand name (i.e., “Precision”) is oriented to a particular regulatory 
focus (i.e., prevention). The conceptual associations that consumers make from brand 
names may be more complex than anticipated, such that there may be individual 
differences unaccounted for in the conceptual framework of this study. Therefore, future 
research would need to identify the nature of these potentially unaccounted individual 
differences. By so doing, it may be easier to predict consumer perceptions of brand types 
with more reliability. The results of such research could have broad implications for 
international marketers, especially as relates to the auto industry. For example, auto 
manufacturers may find that customizing their brand names to match regional markets 
serves to increase sales. More broadly, brands for other types of products could be 
customized to regional markets based on the predominant regulatory orientation in a 
given region. With this new applied marketing perspective, industry markets could 
become more competitive than ever, benefiting whomever is able to use it most 
knowledgeably. 
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  It may also be useful to further explore potential variations in regulatory 
orientation as a function of birth order, parenting style, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, 
and subcultures. Such exploration could yield detailed information about how various 
consumers are likely to respond to the branding choices of marketers. Marketers, as a 
result of such knowledge, would likely be able to produce more effective marketing 
strategies such that more consumers are served and revenues are enhanced. Such 
information could also be used by corporations to more effectively target candidates that 
are in alignment with a given company culture. Further study could potentially take 
marketing into new and previously unexplored directions. 
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 APPENDIX A  
(Individual Difference Measures) 
Promotion-Prevention Scale 
(Lockwood, Jordan, and Kunda, 2002) 
 
Using the scale below, please write the appropriate number in the blank beside each item. 
 
 1   2       3       4         5            6 7   8     9 
        Not at          Very 
        all true         true of 
        of me            me 
 
1. ____  In general, I am focused on preventing negative events in my life. 
 
2. ____  I am anxious that I will fall short of my responsibilities and obligations. 
 
3. ____  I frequently imagine how I will achieve my hopes and aspirations. 
 
4. ____  I often think about the person I am afraid I might become in the future. 
 
5. ____  I often think about the person I would ideally like to be in the future. 
 
6. ____  I typically focus on the success I hope to achieve in the future. 
 
7. ____  I often worry that I will fail to accomplish my academic goals. 
 
8. ____  I often think about how I will achieve academic success. 
 
9. ____  I often imagine myself experiencing bad things that I fear might happen to me. 
 
10. ____  I frequently think about how I can prevent failures in my life. 
 
11. ____  I am more oriented toward preventing losses than I am toward achieving gains. 
 
12. ____  My major goal in school right now is to achieve my academic ambitions. 
 
13. ____  My major goal in school right now is to avoid becoming an academic failure. 
 
14. ____  I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to reach my “ideal self” – to 
fulfill my hopes, wishes, and aspirations. 
 
15. ____  I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to become the self I “ought” 
to be – to fulfill my duties, responsibilities, and obligations. 
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 16. ____  In general, I am focused on achieving positive outcomes in my life. 
 
17. ____  I often imagine myself experiencing good things that I hope will happen to me. 
 
18. ____  Overall, I am more oriented toward achieving success than preventing failure. 
 
Scoring Instructions 
Promotion: Sum the responses for 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, 14, 16, 17, and 18. 
Prevention: Sum the responses for 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 15. 
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 Regulatory Focus Questionnaire 
(Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Idson, Ayduk, & Taylor, 2001) 
 
This set of questions asks you HOW FREQUENTLY specific events actually occur or 
have occurred in your life.  Please indicate your answer to each question by circling the 
appropriate number below it. 
 
1. Compared to most people, are you typically unable to get what you want out of life? 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
      never             sometimes                          very 
      or seldom                  often 
 
2. Growing up, would you ever “cross the line” by doing things that your parents would 
not tolerate? 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
      never             sometimes                          very 
      or seldom                  often 
 
3. How often have you accomplished things that got you “psyched” to work even 
harder? 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
      never             sometimes                          very 
      or seldom                  often 
 
4. Did you get on your parents’ nerves often when you were growing up? 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
      never             sometimes                          very 
      or seldom                  often 
 
5. How often did you obey rules and regulations that were established by your parents? 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
      never             sometimes                          very 
      or seldom                  often 
 
6. Growing up, did you ever act in ways that your parents thought were objectionable? 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
      never             sometimes                          very 
      or seldom                  often 
 
7. Do you often do well at different things that you try? 
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1        2        3        4        5 
      never             sometimes                          very 
      or seldom                  often 
 
8. Not being careful enough has gotten me into trouble at times. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
      never             sometimes                          very 
      or seldom                  often 
 
9. When it comes to achieving things that are important to me, I find that I don’t 
perform as well as I ideally would like to do. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
      never             sometimes                          very 
      true       true        often true 
 
10. I feel like I have made progress toward being successful in my life. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
      certainly                       certainly 
      false                   true 
 
11. I have found very few hobbies or activities in my life that capture my interest or 
motivate me to put effort into them. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
      certainly                       certainly 
      false                   true 
 
Scoring Instructions 
Promotion: Sum (6 – response 1) + response 3 + response 7 + (6 – response 9) + response 
10 + (6 – response 11). 
Prevention: Sum (6 – response 2) + (6 – response 4) + response 5 + (6 – response 6) + (6 
– response 8). 
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 Self-Construal Scale 
(Singelis, 1994) 
 
SD = Strongly Disagree 
D = Disagree 
DS = Disagree Somewhat 
U = Undecided 
AS = Agree Somewhat 
A = Agree 
SA = Agree 
 
1. I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
2. It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
3. My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
4. I would offer my seat in a bus to my professor. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
5. I respect people who are modest about themselves. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
6. I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
7. I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my 
own accomplishments. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
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 8. I should take into consideration my parents’ advice when making education/career 
plans. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
9. It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
10. I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I’m not happy with the group. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
11. If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
     
12. Even when I strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an argument. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
13. I’d rather say “No” directly, than risk being misunderstood. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
14. Speaking up during a class is not a problem for me. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
15. Having a lively imagination is important to me. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
16. I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
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 17. I am the same person at home that I am at school. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
18. Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
19. I act the same way no matter who I am with. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
20. I feel comfortable using someone’s first name soon after I meet them, even when they 
are much older than I am. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
21. I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I’ve just met. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
22. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
23. My personal identity independent of others, is very important to me. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
24. I value being in good health above everything. 
 
SD            D            DS            U            AS            A            SA 
              1      2              3              4              5              6              7 
 
Scoring Instructions 
Independent self-construal: Sum the responses for 1 through 12. 
Interdependent self-construal: Sum the responses for 13 through 24. 
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 APPENDIX B 
(STIMULI) 
B.1 Cars  
 
Airbags: 2 
Entertainment Ports: 4 
Speed: 0 to 60 mph in 9 seconds 
MPG (miles per gallon): 29 city, 37 highway 
Warranty: 4 years 
Car 1 
Heated Seats: Yes 
 
Condition 1: Precision (prevention) 
Condition 2: Prospect (promotion) 
 
Airbags: 4 
Entertainment Ports: 2 
Speed: 0 to 60 mph in 10 seconds 
MPG (miles per gallon): 27 city, 35 highway 
Warranty: 1 year 
 
Car 2 
Heated Seats: Yes 
 
Condition 1: VIP (promotion) 
Condition 2: Imperative (prevention) 
 
Airbags: 1 
Entertainment Ports: 3 
Speed: 0 to 60 mph in 6 seconds 
MPG (miles per gallon): 19 city, 21 highway 
Warranty: 2 years 
Car 3 
Heated Seats: No 
 
Condition 1: Assurance (prevention) 
Condition 2: Crescendo (promotion) 
 
Airbags: 2 
Entertainment Ports: 2 
Speed: 0 to 60 mph in 8 seconds 
MPG (miles per gallon): 20 city, 24 highway 
Warranty: 3 years 
Car 4 
Heated Seats: No 
 
Condition 1: Prospect (promotion) 
Condition 2: Precision (prevention) 
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Airbags: 4 
Entertainment Ports: 0 
Speed: 0 to 60 mph in 6 seconds 
MPG (miles per gallon): 24 city, 31 highway 
Warranty: 1 year 
Car 5 
Heated Seats: Yes 
 
Condition 1: Imperative (prevention) 
Condition 2: VIP (promotion) 
  
Airbags: 1 
Entertainment Ports: 1 
Speed: 0 to 60 mph in 9 seconds 
MPG (miles per gallon): 20 city, 24 highway 
Warranty: 4 years 
Car 6 
Heated Seats: No 
 
Condition 1: Crescendo (promotion) 
Condition 2: Assurance (prevention) 
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 B.2 Car Ratings Questions 
 
1. I like this car. 
 
SA = Strongly Agree   A = Agree   U = Undecided   D = Disagree   SD = Strongly 
Disagree            
 
2. It is easy for me to imagine myself owning this car. 
 
SA = Strongly Agree   A = Agree   U = Undecided   D = Disagree   SD = Strongly 
Disagree            
 
3. This car fits my personality. 
 
SA = Strongly Agree   A = Agree   U = Undecided   D = Disagree   SD = Strongly 
Disagree            
 
4. I would enjoy driving around in this car. 
 
SA = Strongly Agree   A = Agree   U = Undecided   D = Disagree   SD = Strongly 
Disagree            
 
5. This car would be easy to drive. 
 
SA = Strongly Agree   A = Agree   U = Undecided   D = Disagree   SD = Strongly 
Disagree            
 
6. Enter a value between $10,000 and $50,000 (using $1,000 increments) that is the 
most you would be willing to pay for this car. 
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 B.3 Teams 
 
Team 1: Visionaries (promotion) 
Team 2: Guardians (prevention) 
Team 3: Pioneers (promotion) 
Team 4: Citizens (prevention) 
 
B.4 Team Ratings Questions 
 
1. I like this team name. 
 
SA = Strongly Agree   A = Agree   U = Undecided   D = Disagree   SD = Strongly 
Disagree            
 
2. This team name fits who I am. 
 
SA = Strongly Agree   A = Agree   U = Undecided   D = Disagree   SD = Strongly 
Disagree            
 
3. I would be willing to wear clothing with this CSU team name. 
 
SA = Strongly Agree   A = Agree   U = Undecided   D = Disagree   SD = Strongly 
Disagree            
 
4. I would identify with CSU if this team name were adopted. 
 
SA = Strongly Agree   A = Agree   U = Undecided   D = Disagree   SD = Strongly 
Disagree            
 
5. Assuming I had money to spare, if CSU had this team name, it is likely that I would 
donate money to this team in the future. 
 
SA = Strongly Agree   A = Agree   U = Undecided   D = Disagree   SD = Strongly 
Disagree         
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 B.5 Recall Task 
    
The recall task used cars 1, 2, 5, and 6 (See Appendix B.1) 
 
What was the name of the car you just saw? (Conditions 1 and 2) 
1.  VIP 
2.  Prospect 
3.  Imperative 
4.  Crescendo 
5.  Assurance 
6.  Precision 
 
T/F Condition 1, Car 1 
1.  This car has 4 airbags. 
2.  This car has 4 entertainment ports. 
3.  This car has a speed of 0 to 60 mph in 9 seconds. 
4.  This car averages 25 city miles per gallon. 
5.  This car has a 2 year warranty. 
6.  This car has heated seats. 
 
T/F Condition 1, Car 2 
1.  This car has 4 airbags. 
2.  This car has 1 entertainment ports. 
3.  This car has a speed of 0 to 60 mph in 12 seconds. 
4.  This car averages 30 city miles per gallon. 
5.  This car has a 2 year warranty. 
6.  This car has heated seats. 
 
T/F Condition 1, Car 5 
1.  This car has 2 airbags. 
2.  This car has 1 entertainment ports. 
3.  This car has a speed of 0 to 60 mph in 6 seconds. 
4.  This car averages 24 city miles per gallon. 
5.  This car has a 2 year warranty. 
6.  This car has heated seats. 
 
T/F Condition 1, Car 6 
1.  This car has 1 airbags. 
2.  This car has 1 entertainment ports. 
3.  This car has a speed of 0 to 60 mph in 13 seconds. 
4.  This car averages 26 city miles per gallon. 
5.  This car has a 2 year warranty. 
6.  This car has no heated seats. 
 
 
 
 
77
 T/F Condition 2, Car 1 
1.  This car has 4 airbags. 
2.  This car has 4 entertainment ports. 
3.  This car has a speed of 0 to 60 mph in 9 seconds. 
4.  This car averages 25 city miles per gallon. 
5.  This car has a 2 year warranty. 
6.  This car has heated seats. 
 
T/F Condition 2, Car 2 
1.  This car has 4 airbags. 
2.  This car has 1 entertainment ports. 
3.  This car has a speed of 0 to 60 mph in 12 seconds. 
4.  This car averages 30 city miles per gallon. 
5.  This car has a 2 year warranty. 
6.  This car has heated seats. 
 
T/F Condition 2, Car 5 
1.  This car has 2 airbags. 
2.  This car has 1 entertainment ports. 
3.  This car has a speed of 0 to 60 mph in 6 seconds. 
4.  This car averages 24 city miles per gallon. 
5.  This car has a 2 year warranty. 
6.  This car has heated seats. 
 
T/F Condition 2, Car 6 
1.  This car has 1 airbags. 
2.  This car has 1 entertainment ports. 
3.  This car has a speed of 0 to 60 mph in 13 seconds. 
4.  This car averages 26 city miles per gallon. 
5.  This car has a 2 year warranty. 
6.  This car has no heated seats. 
 
Where do you think this car was made? (Conditions 1 and 2) 
1.  US 
2.  Japan 
3.  Germany 
4.  None of the above 
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 B.6 Demographic Questions 
 
1.  What is your sex? 
 
1 = Male    2 = Female    3 = Prefer not to answer  
 
2.  What is your ethnicity? 
 
1 = Caucasian    2 = African-American     3 = Hispanic     4 = Asian     5 = Other   
6 = Prefer not to answer  
 
3.  Have you ever lived in other countries? 
 
1 = Yes       2 = No      3 = Prefer not to answer 
 
4.  If yes, where and for how long? Type your answer. If no, type “no”. If you prefer not 
to answer, please type “prefer not to answer”. 
 
5.  Do you have recent immigrants in your family? (e.g. parents, siblings) 
 
1 = Yes       2 = No      3 = Prefer not to answer 
 
6.  If yes, what country are they from? Type your answer. If no, type “no”. If you prefer 
not to answer, please type “prefer not to answer”. 
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 APPENDIX C 
(ANOVA TABLES) 
 
 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car1ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 193.904(a) 4 48.476 2.624 .043
Intercept 1065.364 1 1065.364 57.672 .000
msprev 1.164 1 1.164 .063 .803
msprom 3.427 1 3.427 .185 .668
cond 102.131 1 102.131 5.529 .022
msprom * cond 88.167 1 88.167 4.773 .033
Error 1163.787 63 18.473    
Total 13349.000 68     
Corrected Total 1357.691 67     
a  R Squared = .143 (Adjusted R Squared = .088) 
 
Table V: Car 1 Promotion 
 
 
 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car1ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 197.035(a) 4 49.259 2.674 .040
Intercept 923.350 1 923.350 50.119 .000
msprom 14.764 1 14.764 .801 .374
msprev .863 1 .863 .047 .829
cond 99.381 1 99.381 5.394 .023
msprev * cond 91.298 1 91.298 4.956 .030
Error 1160.656 63 18.423    
Total 13349.000 68     
Corrected Total 1357.691 67     
a  R Squared = .145 (Adjusted R Squared = .091) 
 
Table VI: Car 1 Prevention 
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  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car1ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 119.953(a) 4 29.988 1.610 .184
Intercept 766.009 1 766.009 41.124 .000
msc 22.148 1 22.148 1.189 .280
msi 10.948 1 10.948 .588 .446
cond 69.730 1 69.730 3.744 .058
msi * cond 22.613 1 22.613 1.214 .275
Error 1061.725 57 18.627    
Total 11974.000 62     
Corrected Total 1181.677 61     
a  R Squared = .102 (Adjusted R Squared = .038) 
 
Table VII: Car 1 Independent 
 
 
 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car1ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 97.900(a) 4 24.475 1.287 .286
Intercept 1256.222 1 1256.222 66.069 .000
msi 10.981 1 10.981 .578 .450
msc 24.046 1 24.046 1.265 .265
cond 73.105 1 73.105 3.845 .055
msc * cond .560 1 .560 .029 .864
Error 1083.778 57 19.014    
Total 11974.000 62     
Corrected Total 1181.677 61     
a  R Squared = .083 (Adjusted R Squared = .018) 
 
Table VIII: Car 1 Interdependent 
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  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car2ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 72.552(a) 4 18.138 1.200 .320
Intercept 1043.079 1 1043.079 69.013 .000
msprev 1.988 1 1.988 .132 .718
msprom .475 1 .475 .031 .860
cond 11.180 1 11.180 .740 .393
msprom * cond 60.767 1 60.767 4.021 .049
Error 952.198 63 15.114    
Total 12963.000 68     
Corrected Total 1024.750 67     
a  R Squared = .071 (Adjusted R Squared = .012) 
 
Table IX: Car 2 Promotion 
 
 
 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car2ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 33.477(a) 4 8.369 .532 .713
Intercept 1033.402 1 1033.402 65.677 .000
msprom 3.395 1 3.395 .216 .644
msprev .004 1 .004 .000 .987
cond 10.495 1 10.495 .667 .417
msprev * cond 21.692 1 21.692 1.379 .245
Error 991.273 63 15.734    
Total 12963.000 68     
Corrected Total 1024.750 67     
a  R Squared = .033 (Adjusted R Squared = -.029) 
 
Table X: Car 2 Prevention 
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  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car2ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 93.940(a) 4 23.485 1.813 .139
Intercept 583.178 1 583.178 45.015 .000
msc 65.473 1 65.473 5.054 .028
msi .414 1 .414 .032 .859
cond 4.864 1 4.864 .375 .542
msi * cond 31.318 1 31.318 2.417 .126
Error 738.447 57 12.955    
Total 11572.000 62     
Corrected Total 832.387 61     
a  R Squared = .113 (Adjusted R Squared = .051) 
 
Table XI: Car 2 Independent 
 
 
 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car2ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 62.663(a) 4 15.666 1.160 .338
1075.200 1 1075.200 79.621 .000
msi .438 1 .438 .032 .858
msc 61.938 1 61.938 4.587 .037
cond 3.915 1 3.915 .290 .592
msc * cond .040 1 .040 .003 .957
Error 769.724 57 13.504    
Total 11572.000 62     
Corrected Total 832.387 61     
Intercept 
a  R Squared = .075 (Adjusted R Squared = .010) 
 
Table XII: Car 2 Interdependent 
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  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car3ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 153.685(a) 4 38.421 1.813 .137
Intercept 1185.329 1 1185.329 55.934 .000
msprev 58.518 1 58.518 2.761 .102
msprom 58.026 1 58.026 2.738 .103
cond 3.160 1 3.160 .149 .701
msprom * cond 17.145 1 17.145 .809 .372
Error 1335.080 63 21.192    
Total 19870.000 68     
Corrected Total 1488.765 67     
a  R Squared = .103 (Adjusted R Squared = .046) 
 
Table XIII: Car 3 Promotion 
 
 
 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car3ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 143.536(a) 4 35.884 1.681 .166
Intercept 1213.345 1 1213.345 56.824 .000
msprom 54.153 1 54.153 2.536 .116
msprev 52.309 1 52.309 2.450 .123
cond 3.021 1 3.021 .141 .708
msprev * cond 6.996 1 6.996 .328 .569
Error 1345.229 63 21.353    
Total 19870.000 68     
Corrected Total 1488.765 67     
a  R Squared = .096 (Adjusted R Squared = .039) 
 
Table XIV: Car 3 Prevention 
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  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car3ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7.427(a) 4 1.857 .078 .989
Intercept 1440.276 1 1440.276 60.730 .000
msc 5.700 1 5.700 .240 .626
msi .475 1 .475 .020 .888
cond 1.798 1 1.798 .076 .784
msi * cond .298 1 .298 .013 .911
Error 1351.814 57 23.716    
Total 18371.000 62     
Corrected Total 1359.242 61     
a  R Squared = .005 (Adjusted R Squared = -.064) 
 
Table XV: Car 3 Independent 
 
 
 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car3ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7.936(a) 4 1.984 .084 .987
Intercept 1685.038 1 1685.038 71.077 .000
msi .422 1 .422 .018 .894
msc 5.819 1 5.819 .245 .622
cond 1.868 1 1.868 .079 .780
msc * cond .806 1 .806 .034 .854
Error 1351.306 57 23.707    
Total 18371.000 62     
Corrected Total 1359.242 61     
a  R Squared = .006 (Adjusted R Squared = -.064) 
 
Table XVI: Car 3 Interdependent 
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  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car4ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 74.877(a) 4 18.719 .617 .652
Intercept 1100.883 1 1100.883 36.285 .000
msprev 28.940 1 28.940 .954 .332
msprom 31.089 1 31.089 1.025 .315
cond 1.518 1 1.518 .050 .824
msprom * cond 3.040 1 3.040 .100 .753
Error 1911.402 63 30.340    
Total 17497.000 68     
Corrected Total 1986.279 67     
a  R Squared = .038 (Adjusted R Squared = -.023) 
 
Table XVII: Car 4 Promotion 
 
 
 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car4ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 72.651(a) 4 18.163 .598 .665
Intercept 1092.520 1 1092.520 35.968 .000
msprom 33.119 1 33.119 1.090 .300
msprev 26.129 1 26.129 .860 .357
cond 1.463 1 1.463 .048 .827
msprev * cond .814 1 .814 .027 .871
Error 1913.629 63 30.375    
Total 17497.000 68     
Corrected Total 1986.279 67     
a  R Squared = .037 (Adjusted R Squared = -.025) 
 
Table XVIII: Car 4 Prevention 
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  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car4ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 131.252(a) 4 32.813 1.210 .317
Intercept 940.067 1 940.067 34.666 .000
msc 40.461 1 40.461 1.492 .227
msi 53.702 1 53.702 1.980 .165
cond 9.512 1 9.512 .351 .556
msi * cond 18.911 1 18.911 .697 .407
Error 1545.716 57 27.118    
Total 15868.000 62     
Corrected Total 1676.968 61     
a  R Squared = .078 (Adjusted R Squared = .014) 
 
Table XIX: Car 4 Independent 
 
 
 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car4ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 114.078(a) 4 28.519 1.040 .395
Intercept 1942.560 1 1942.560 70.847 .000
msi 54.711 1 54.711 1.995 .163
msc 38.291 1 38.291 1.397 .242
cond 10.682 1 10.682 .390 .535
msc * cond 1.737 1 1.737 .063 .802
Error 1562.890 57 27.419    
Total 15868.000 62     
Corrected Total 1676.968 61     
a  R Squared = .068 (Adjusted R Squared = .003) 
 
Table XX: Car 4 Interdependent 
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  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car5ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 123.416(a) 4 30.854 1.575 .192
Intercept 1881.802 1 1881.802 96.036 .000
msprev 37.336 1 37.336 1.905 .172
msprom 69.339 1 69.339 3.539 .065
cond 9.973 1 9.973 .509 .478
msprom * cond 35.927 1 35.927 1.833 .181
Error 1234.466 63 19.595    
Total 16300.000 68     
Corrected Total 1357.882 67     
a  R Squared = .091 (Adjusted R Squared = .033) 
 
Table XXI: Car 5 Promotion 
 
 
 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car5ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 112.008(a) 4 28.002 1.416 .239
Intercept 882.540 1 882.540 44.627 .000
msprom 75.200 1 75.200 3.803 .056
msprev 30.448 1 30.448 1.540 .219
cond 9.638 1 9.638 .487 .488
msprev * cond 24.518 1 24.518 1.240 .270
Error 1245.874 63 19.776    
Total 16300.000 68     
Corrected Total 1357.882 67     
a  R Squared = .082 (Adjusted R Squared = .024) 
 
Table XXII: Car 5 Prevention 
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  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car5ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 203.364(a) 4 50.841 2.739 .037
Intercept 1190.656 1 1190.656 64.147 .000
msc .346 1 .346 .019 .892
msi 7.937 1 7.937 .428 .516
cond 6.637 1 6.637 .358 .552
msi * cond 185.758 1 185.758 10.008 .002
Error 1057.991 57 18.561    
Total 14384.000 62     
Corrected Total 1261.355 61     
a  R Squared = .161 (Adjusted R Squared = .102) 
 
Table XXIII: Car 5 Independent 
 
 
 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: car5ratings  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 26.945(a) 4 6.736 .311 .869
Intercept 1440.551 1 1440.551 66.519 .000
msi 7.595 1 7.595 .351 .556
msc .001 1 .001 .000 .994
cond 9.787 1 9.787 .452 .504
msc * cond 9.340 1 9.340 .431 .514
Error 1234.410 57 21.656    
Total 14384.000 62     
Corrected Total 1261.355 61     
a  R Squared = .021 (Adjusted R Squared = -.047) 
 
Table XXIV: Car 5 Interdependent 
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  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: rating1-4; alph = .89  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 31.951(a) 4 7.988 1.315 .274
Intercept 289.645 1 289.645 47.684 .000
msprev 3.760 1 3.760 .619 .434
msprom .020 1 .020 .003 .954
cond 2.700 1 2.700 .445 .507
msprom * cond 28.080 1 28.080 4.623 .035
Error 382.681 63 6.074    
Total 4165.000 68     
Corrected Total 414.632 67     
a  R Squared = .077 (Adjusted R Squared = .018) 
 
Table XXV: Car 6 Promotion 
 
 
 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: rating1-4; alph = .89  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 23.344(a) 4 5.836 .940 .447
Intercept 323.434 1 323.434 52.075 .000
msprom 1.260 1 1.260 .203 .654
msprev .768 1 .768 .124 .726
cond 2.461 1 2.461 .396 .531
msprev * cond 19.472 1 19.472 3.135 .081
Error 391.289 63 6.211    
Total 4165.000 68     
Corrected Total 414.632 67     
a  R Squared = .056 (Adjusted R Squared = -.004) 
 
Table XXVI: Car 6 Prevention 
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  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: rating1-4; alph = .89  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 30.951(a) 4 7.738 1.545 .202
Intercept 256.137 1 256.137 51.135 .000
msc 4.086 1 4.086 .816 .370
msi 25.679 1 25.679 5.126 .027
cond .208 1 .208 .042 .839
msi * cond .551 1 .551 .110 .741
Error 285.517 57 5.009    
Total 3685.000 62     
Corrected Total 316.468 61     
a  R Squared = .098 (Adjusted R Squared = .034) 
 
Table XXVII: Car 6 Independent 
 
 
 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: rating1-4; alph = .89  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 57.943(a) 4 14.486 3.194 .020
Intercept 494.163 1 494.163 108.954 .000
msi 23.554 1 23.554 5.193 .026
msc 3.984 1 3.984 .878 .353
cond .224 1 .224 .049 .825
msc * cond 27.543 1 27.543 6.073 .017
Error 258.525 57 4.536    
Total 3685.000 62     
Corrected Total 316.468 61     
a  R Squared = .183 (Adjusted R Squared = .126) 
 
Table XXVIII: Car 6 Interdependent 
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